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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Appeal and Error-Power of Superior Court to Remand to Industrial
Commission Case Remanded by Supreme Court for Judgment
of Dismissal for Want of Jurisdiction.
Plaintiff instituted proceedings under the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, and the Industrial Commission awarded compensation. Defendants then appealed to the Superior Court, where the
jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission was challenged for the first
time on the ground that the record showed that the Commission had no
jurisdiction, the only evidence in the record being a statement by defendant to the effect that he had employed three other men than himself. The Superior Court, however, affirmed the award and defendants
appealed. The Supreme Court held that the Industrial Commission had
no jurisdiction and reversed and remanded the case to the Superior
Court for judgment in accordance with the opinion. While the case was
pending in the Superior Court, plaintiffs moved to remand to the Industrial Commission to hear specific evidence on the number of employees
employed by defendant. This motion was allowed, and defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. Held, that the Superior Court had power
to remand the case and judgment affirmed.'
The Workmen's Compensation Act provides no specific method by
which a case may be appealed; §602 provides that either party may
"appeal from the decision of the said Commission to the Superior Court
of the county in which the alleged accident happened... under the same
terms and conditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil actions." From
the wording of §60, no greater liberality should be accorded in applying
it (giving effect to its application) than is used in appeals from courts
in general.
Prior to the principal case, the Supreme Court consistently applied
the rules governing appeals from the justice of the peace courts in determining the method of appeal from administrative or quasi-judicial
commissions, when the statute creating such commissions was silent as
to any specific method of appeal. When the question of appeal from the
Corporation Commission, now the Public Utilities Commission, was first
presented, the Court adopted the rules of procedure from the justice's
court.3 The same rule has been followed in regard to appeal from
Thompson v. Johnson Funeral Home, 208 N. C. 178, 179 S. E. 801 (1935).
N. C. CODE (1935) §8081 (ppp).
3 Corporation Commission v. Southern Railway Co., 196 N. C. 190, 145 S. E. 19
(1928).
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county commissioners. 4 With these decisions before it, the Court
adopted the same principle in regard to appeal from the Industrial
Commission.5
On appeal from a justice of the peace, the jurisdiction of the Superior Court is derivative, not original, and if the justice had no jurisdiction, the Superior Court can have none, and can only dismiss the
case." This is strikingly illustrated in the situation which arises under
the statutory provision 7 that, where the amount demanded in a suit
brought before a justice is in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the
plaintiff may remit the excess so as to give the justice jurisdiction. 8 If
the rernittituris not made in the justice's court, and the case reaches the
Superior Court on appeal, the latter Court can acquire no jurisdiction
by remittitur or amendment.0 If such orders for remittitur or amendment are, in this situation, coram -non judice and void, the same is inevitably true of the order for remand in the instant case.
It is true that the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction was vigorously
attacked in dissenting opinions by the late Chief Justice Clark. He
assailed the doctrine as not being founded upon the Constitution and as
being a creature of judicial construction. The mainstay of his argument was that the Superior Court was a court of general jurisdiction
and that on appeal from a justice's court the trial was de -nvo. However, he asserted that "if on appeal from the justice of the peace to the
Superior Court the inquiry were confined to the question whether error
had been committed in the Court below, there would be a logical basis
for the doctrine of 'derivative jurisdiction'."10 The jurisdiction of the
Superior Court on appeal from the Industrial Commission is limited to
questions of law only ;"1 therefore, conceding the criticism of the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction espoused by the late Chief Justice as
'Blair v. Coakley, 136 N. C.405, 48 S. E. 804 (1904).
'Higdon v. Nantahala Power & Light Co., 207 N. C. 39, 175 S. E. 710 (1934).

The Court said: "It has been held in this State that where no -procedure has been
prescribed by statute for appeals, the rules regulating appeals from the justices of
the peace are applicable and control."
'Durham Fertilizer Co. v. Marshburn, 122 N. C. 411, 29 S. E. 411 (1898);
McLaurin v. McIntyre, 167 N. C. 350, 83 S. E. 629 (1914) ; Lower Creek Drainage
Commission v. Sparks, 179 N. C. 581, 103 S. E. 142 (1920). The same conclusion
was reached on an appeal from the Corporation Commission, now the Public Utilities Commission. Corporation Commission v. Southern Railway Co., 196 N. C.
190, 145 S. E. 19 (1928). Likewise, in an appeal from a statutory court of the
City of High Point. Lewellyn.v. Lewellyn, 203 N. C. 575, 166 S. E. 737 (1932).
There is a strong inference that the same result would be reached in an appeal
from
7 county commissioners. Blair v. Coakley, 136 N. C. 405, 48 S. E. 804 (1904).

N. C. CoDE (1935) §1475.

8
Brock
9

v. Scott, 159 N. C. 513, 75 S. E. 724 (1912).
Perry v. Pulley, 206 N. C. 701, 175 S. E. 89 (1934).
10 Stacey Cheese Co. v. Pipkin, 155 N. C. 394, 401, 71 S. E. 442, 445 (1911).
SN. C. CODE (1935) §8081; Byrd v. Glouchester Lumber Co., 207 N. C. 253,
176 S. E. 572 (1934).

78

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

*

being legitimate, it could find no application to the situation of appeal
from the Industrial Commission, for the purpose of such appeal comes
within the purview of the exception which he enunciated, since on appeal
the trial is not de novo.
Obviously, then, if the Industrial Commission had no jurisdiction,
and the Court so held, the Superior Court could acquire none, and when
the Court held otherwise it did so in complete derogation of the "law
of the case." It is a well established rule in this state that, while the
decision of the appellate court is absolutely binding upon the action of
the lower court, it also fixes the "law of the case" in the Supreme
Court,12 which may be changed only by petition to rehear.

Although the decision of the principal case purports to be based on
precedent, the three cases cited are not in point. One case18 involved
the question of the power of the Superior Court, in instances of newly
discovered evidence, to remand the case for a rehearing; the second
case' 4 involved the issue as to whether the Industrial Commission had
authority to vacate an award and make its record speak the truth; and
the third case' 5 was a holding for the proposition that the Industrial
Commission had power to grant a rehearing for newly discovered
evidence.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Clarkson probably intimated the real
motive behind the decision. He openly confessed that his objection was
that the insurance company, on a mere technicality, would be getting out
of something it had obligated itself to pay. That, he said, would be an
injustice. According to this theory, it is a mere technicality when a
plaintiff fails to make out his case under provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. This is inconsistent with the same Justice's holding
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 196 N. C. 14, 141 S. E. 337 (1928).
"Byrd v. Glouchester Lumber Co., 207 N. C. 253, 176 S. E. 572 (1934). Plain-

'" Newbern

tiff was denied recovery by the Commission on the ground that the accident did
not arise out of and in the course of his employment, and plaintiff appealed to the
Superior Court, where, before the case was heard on its merits, plaintiff moved
that a rehearing be granted before the Industrial Commission on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The motion was allowed, and defendant appealed.
Judgment was affirmed, the holding being that in certain instances of newly discovered evidence the Superior Court has discretionary power to remand for rehearing. (Here the Superior Court had jurisdiction of the case.)
-'Ruth v. Carolina Cleaners, 206 N. C. 54, 174 S. E. 445 (1934). The Commission granted a trial de novo, as the award had been made contrary to law, and
defendant appealed. The Superior Court affirmed the ruling and remanded the
case. Defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court, where it was held that the
Industrial Commission had the authority to vacate the award and make its record
speak the truth. (No jurisdiction of the Superior Court was involved.)
I Butts v. Montague Bros., 208 N. C. 186, 179 S. E. 799 (1935). This case
merely involved the question whether the Industrial Commission had power to
grant a rehearing for newly discovered evidence, even though the case had been
remanded -by the Superior Court for a specific purpose. (No question of the power
of the Superior Court to remand the case.)

NOTES'AND COMMENTS
that it is not a mere technicality when a defendant in a counterclaim
fails to enter a remittitur in the justice's court for the amount claimed
in excess of the justice's jurisdiction.1 6 In each instance the lower
tribunal has no jurisdiction, and the Superior Court should not be allowed to acquire any.
Furthermore, the instant holding was not necessary to prevent the
insurance company from escaping liability, unless the statute of limitations had run. It might have ultimately been held liable in a new
proceeding initiated before the Commission. A judgment of dismissal
for want of jurisdiction is not on the merits and hence does not bar a
17
new suit wherein jurisdiction is established.
It is submitted that the ruling in the principal case presents an
anomalous situation, as it leaves one in doubt as to what the real status
of appeal from the Industrial Commission is. Quite conceivably the
Supreme Court, with the same circuity of reasoning, might refuse to
follow the rule in the principal case and revert to their previously laiddown rule that such appeals are governed 'by the rules relating to appeals
from the justice's court. It is also submitted that such an abrupt departure from a well-established principle without cognizable justification
destroys that stability of judicial precedent upon which disputants in
litigation have a right of reasonable reliance.
STATON P. WILLIAMS.

Bankruptcy-Rights of Partially Secured Creditors.
An earlier issue of this publication contained a comment discussing
the four rules which govern the rights of partially secured creditors in
the distribution of insolvent estates.1 It is there pointed out that the
"bankruptcy" rule is embodied in the National Bankruptcy Act,2 and is
usually thought to govern in bankruptcy cases.
Perry v. Pulley, 206 N. C. 701, 175 S. E. 89 (1935).
"Brick v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 145 N. C. 203, 59 S. E. 50 (1907).
Plaintiff brought action in justice's court to recover value of contents of a trunk.
The trunk contained $46.75 worth of clothing, and jewelry to value of $207.83. In the
justice's court it was held that plaintiff could not recover the value of the jewelry
and judgment was rendered for $46.75. On appeal to the Supreme Court, judgment was affirmed on ground that the action being in tort and in excess of $50,
the justice had no jurisdiction over the claim for the jewelry. Thereupon plaintiff
instituted this new action in the Superior Court, founded in tort, asking for recovery of the value of the jewelry. Facts were found to be as testified by plaintiff
in the former trial. Held, that plaintiff was not estopped by the former judgment.
I Comment (1935) 13 N. C. L. Rlv. 239. For further discussion, see Citizens'
& Southern Bank v. Alexander, 147 Ga. 74, 92 S. E. 868 (1917) ; Clark, Proof by
Secured Creditorsin Insolvency and Receivership Proceedings (1920) 15 ILL. L.
REv. 171; Notes (1908) 21 HARv. L. REv. 280; (1910) 23 HAgv. L. Rv.219;
MINx. L. Rav. 232; L. R. A. 1918B, 1024,
(1912) 12 COL. L. Rav. 255; (1924) 8 239,
240.
2 Comment (1935) 13 N. C. L. REv.
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An interesting exception to that situation is presented in the recent
case of Ivanhoe Building & Loan Ass'n. of Newark v. Orr.a The bankrupt was liable on a bond, secured by a mortgage on property which did
not belong to him. The creditor foreclosed the mortgage, and bid the
property in at a nominal figure. It (the creditor) then filed a claim in
the bankruptcy proceedings for the amount due on the bond, less the
amount of the nominal bid. The referee reduced the claim to the amount
due on the bond, less the actual value of the property, and his action
was sustained by the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling, on the ground that, since the
property did not belong to the bankrupt, the creditor was not a "secured
creditor" within the definition in Section 1 (23), 4 and therefore its rights
were not governed by Section 57(e). 5 Hence, the Court said these
sections did not "forbid the proof of a claim for the principal of the
bond with interest, though the petitioner [creditor] may not collect and
retain dividends which with the sum realized from the foreclosure will
more than make up that amount."
This return to the "chancery" rule again illustrates the Court's longmaintained preference, 6 and serves as fair warning that, hereafter, the
Court will, in all probability, apply that rule, even in bankruptcy cases,
whenever it is not bound by strict statutory language.
D. W. MARKHAM.
Bills and Notes-Adoption of Printed Seal.
A hurrying age has largely cast seals on the scrapheap. In states
where they are not abolished their formality and significance are much
impaired by either statutory or judicial action.1 Yet even in such an
'55 Sup. Ct. 685 (U. S. 1935).
"30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §1(23) (1927).
130 STAT. 560 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §93(e) (1927).
'See Clark, mpra note 1.

'In the following states private seals have been abolished: Aaxz. REv. CODE
(Struckmeyer, 1928) §3048 (except corporate seals) ; ARK. Co~sT. of 1874, Schedule 1; CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1931) §1932; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932)
§§28-108; IOWA CODE (1931) §9439; IMr. REv. STAT. (1923) c. 16, §106 (except
corporate seals); Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) §471; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927)

§6933 (except corporate seals) ; Miss. CODE (1930) §3302 (except corporate seals) ;
Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §2957 (except corporate seals); MoNT. REv. CoDEs (1921)
§7524; NEB. Comp. STAT. (1929) c. 76, §256; N. M. STAT. ANN. (1929) §117-105
(except corporate seals); N. D. CoMp. LAws (1913) §5894; OHIO ANN. ConE
(Throckmorton, 1929) §32; OKLA. COMP. STAT. (1921) §5037; S. D. Comp. LAWS
(1929) §864; TENN. CODE: (1932) §7828 (except corporate seals) ; TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. (Vernon, 1935) art. 27 (except corporate seals) ; WASH. REV. STAT. (Remington, 1933) §10556; Wyo. REv. STAT. (1931) c. 97, §122 (except corporate seals).
The effect of this legislation has in most instances been to reduce the status of
a sealed instrument to that of a written contract. In some states, however, just
the reverse seems to have happened. In these states statutes provide that the distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments shall be abolished, but written
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Turner,2

decided last spring, came
atmosphere the case of Williams v.
as something of a shock to the bar and has doubtless outlawed, without
warning or opportunity for preventive measures, a considerable amount
of overdue commercial paper heretofore considered enforceable under the
long statute of limitations for sealed instruments. A promissory note,
says the decision, though it bears after the maker's signature the printed
symbol, "(SEAL)", is not legally a sealed instrument unless there is
additional evidence of a specific intention to adopt the printed seal as
the maker's own.3
instruments shall "import a consideration" in the same manner as sealed instru-

ments have formerly done. Aaiz. REv. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) §3048; Mo. REV.
STAT. (1929) §2958; N. M. STAT. ANN. (1929) §45-608. In Indiana and Wyoming
"every writing not sealed shall have the same force and effect that it would have
if sealed."

IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §2-1601; Wyo. REv. STAT. (1931)

c.

97, §123. In South Dakota a written instrument is "presumptive evidence of consideration." S. D. Comp. LAWS (1929) §848.
Many of those states which still retain the distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments have nevertheless cut down on the common law effect of a seal.
Statutes in these states provide that, in an action on a sealed instrument, the seal
shall be merely presumptive evidence of consideration which may be rebutted.
MicH. Comp. LAWS (1929) §14200 (presumption of consideration arising from the
presence of a seal "may be rebutted in the same manner, and to the same extent,
as if such instrument were not sealed") ; N. J.COMP. STAT. (1911) p. 2240, §66;
N. Y. Civ. Pn.c. AcT §342; OnE. CODE ANN. (1930) §9-704 (seal is "primary"
evidence of consideration) ; Wis. STAT. (1931) c. 328, §27.
In other states a seal is no longer necessary to convey the legal title to land.
ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) §6839; CoLO. ANY. STAT. (Courtright's Mills, 1930)
§823; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §56-104; MIcH. ComP. LAws (1929)
§14007; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) §4270; S. D. Comp. LAws (1929) §541; UTAH

REv. STAT. (1933) tit. 104, c. 48, §4; W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 3, §1.
In many of the states still requiring seals for certain instruments, scrolls and
printed insignia are sufficient as seals. CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Courtright's Mills,
1930) §824; CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §5615; FA. Comr. GEN. LAWS (1927)
§5704, §5705; GA. CODE (Michie, 1926) §5; ILL. Rsv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 29,

§1; MicH. Comp. LAWS (1929) §13313; N. Y. CON. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 23,
§44; OMa. CODE ANN. (1930)

§9-703; UTAHa REv. STAT. (1933)

tit. 104, c. 48, §2;

VT. GEN. LAWs (1917) §22; VA. CODE (Michie, 1930)' §5562, §5; W. VA. CODE
(1931) c. 2, art. 2, §6; Wis. STAT. (1931) c. 235, §17.
Even the requirements of official sealing are modified in various ways. See
N. C. CODE (1935) §§3179, 3297, 3949 (8), and §7880 (97), tax law, which recogInizes the -possible use of scrolls for official seals. A seal no longer converts an
otherwise negotiable instrument into a non-negotiable specialty. Pate v. Brown,
85 N. C. 166 (1881); NEGoTIAL

INsTRUMENTs LAW §6, par. 4.

And generally

is not conclusive evidence of consideration. Citizen's Nat. Bk. v. Curtis, 153 Md.
235, 138 Atl. 261 (1927) ; Patterson v. Fuller, 203 N. C. 788, 791, 167 S.E. 74, 75
(1932) ; Lentz v. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 207 N. C. 614, 178 S.E. 226 (1935) (1927)
25 MicH. L. REv. 208; cf. Ducker v. Whitson, 112 N. C. 44, 53-54, 16 S.E. 854,
857 (1893). Whether the rebuttable presumption of consideration from a seal is any
greater a procedural asset than the prima facie case created by the Law Merchant,--see Campbell v. McCormac, 90 N. C. 491 (1884)-and, by Negotiable Instruments Law §24, may hinge on whether a presumption is treated in the particular jurisdiction as doing more than to take the case to the jury. See generally
on that McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof (1927)
N. C. L. REv. 291; and 5 WiGmoE, EvImENcE (2d ed. 1923) §§2483-98.

5

'208 N. C. 202, 179 S.E. 806 (1935).
The finding at trial here was that the maker of the note did not "adopt as his
seal the word '(seal)' unless he did so by writing his name on said line at the
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That evidence might, it seems, be either in the form of a recital in
the body of the instrument, 4 or, of some special manifestation by the
maker of an intent to execute a sealed instrument,u-this last, an almost
unheard of circumstance and a possibility, therefore of little practical
significance.
The decision was not demanded by an earlier binding decision in a
case on all fours, for there was no such case; nor by inescapable logic
from a long line of analogous North Carolina cases, for there were no
such cases ;6 nor did it bow to any overwhelming weight of authority
right band end of which is printed '[Seal]'." This is treated on appeal as a finding
that the maker had no intention of executing a sealed instrument, seemingly too
strict an inference. It could mean equally, and probably did mean, that there was
no other evidence of any intention on the matter. Though defendant's plea of the
three-year statute of limitations might be regarded as denying an intent to execute
a sealed instrument, it does not appear that the plea was introduced in evidence for
this purpose. Even if the court did not want to go to the length of the Restatement
of Contracts in creating a conclusive presumption, it could, out of deference to the
widespread use of this form under the supposition that it provided sealed paper,
have recognized the signing as described to create a rebuttable 'presumption of an
intent to adopt the seal, as was done in the case of a paper paster in Hughes v.
Debnam, 53 N. C. 127 (1860), according to the headnote, though the report itself
seems more doubtful. Cf. RESTATEMENT, CONMACTS (1932) §98, subsection 1 with
subsection 2.
'It is understood that some lawyers in consequence of this case are changing
their note forms by incorporating a recital of sealing in addition to the printed
seal at the end of the signing line. Yet the case does not say that such a recital
will conclude the matter and there is local authority that the question is one of
actual intention and so a jury question even when there is a recital. Pickens v.
Rymer, 90 N. C. 282 (1884) (2 signers, one seal). Where, as in such a case, the
only evidence of intent is what appears on the instrument, the folly of leaving it
to the variable results of a jury verdict would seem only too evident. Other cases
sound contra, that a recital establishes adoption of the seal and that it is a matter
for judicial determination. Harrell & Co. v. Butler, 92 N. C. 20, 23 (1885);
Devereux v. McMahon, 108 N. C. 134, 141, 12 S. E. 902, 904 (1891) sevible; Benbow v. Cook, 115 N. C. 324, 332, 20 S. E. 453, 455 (1894), cited and quoted in
Bailey v. Hassell, 184 N. C. 450, 456, 115 S. E. 166, 170 (1922), although in that
case a jury had found adoption from extrinsic evidence. See also, Jacksonville,
M. P. Ry. v. Hooper, 160 U. S. 514, 16 Sup. Ct. 379, 40 L. ed. 515 (1896), relied
on in the instant case. But those were cases where a seal was necessary to the
validity of the instrument and cannot be definitely relied upon in view of the intimation in the instant decision that a different rule may then apply as in Virginia.
Note (1928) 15 VA. L. Rxv. 91, 92. See also dissent of Henderson, C. J., in
Yarborough v. Monday, 13 N. C. 493, 495 (1830), considering the word "Indenture" in the body of the instrument sufficient evidence of the adoption of a
seal by two signers. The usual recital will, of course, not satisfy the requirements
of the Code for registering deeds. Withrell v. Murphey, 154 N. C. 82, 87, 69
S. E. 748, 751 (1910). In the following cases there was no evidence of any recital:
Taylor v. Heggie, 83 N. C. 244 (1880); Clayton v. Cagle, 97 N. C. 300, 1 S. E.
523 (1887) ; Caldwell v. Morganton Mfg. Co., 121 N. C. 339, 28 S. E. 475 (1897) ;
cf. the now probably obsolete view that the recital cannot prove the seal since the
seal must prove the deed of which the recital is but a part. Ingram v. Hall, 2
N. C. 193, 209 (1795).
Something of that sort might arise by a vote of stockholders, authorizing, for
example, an issue of "bonds." Cf. Bailey v. Hassell, 184 N. C. 450, 455, 115 S. E.
166, 169 (1922).
0While it has been repeatedly said that the question of adopting a seal is one of
the signer's intent, only one previous case has been found in which the symbol was
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elsewhere, for there was no citation of such overwhelming weight of
authority, nor is there any such.7 And the decision is contrary to the
rule adopted by the American Law Institute8 which customarily follows
a clear weight of authority if there is one.9 So far as the state of the
authorities is concerned it might have gone either way-it was a purely
policy decision. When that is the case, a widespread expression of dissatisfaction, such as has been heard in this instance, gives rise to doubts.
If the transition from formal, impressive seals in wax, 10 to assorted
scrawls, miniature sun-flowers and other penned symbols and printed
insignia be considered,11 some light will be shed on the reasons which
should underlie a decision on the matter. When any non-descript mark
12
once came to be relied upon and legally approved as a sufficient seal,'
at once, (1) a clearly designated seal, and, (2) so situated as to relate clearly to
the signature of the one sought to be charged with adopting it. Devereux v. McMahon, 108 N. C. 134, 12 S. E. 902 (1891). That case came up from a jury verdict but contains a statement that signing before a seal automatically created a
deed (p. 141). It is not an authority for the present case since the present decision thought it necessary to distinguish it on the ground that the instrument was
there one requiring a seal for validity. Cases where the mark is of uncertain
character or is in an unusual or seemingly unrelated location (see notes 13 and
17, infra), are only remotely analogous and of very little persuasive weight.
7 There is usually said to be a split of authority. See 56 C. J., Seals, §5; 1
DAxmL, NEt;. IxsTR. (7th ed. 1933) 32-33, after first stating the rule as announced
in the instant case; Billig and Wunschel, The Private Seal in West Virginia
(1934) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 330, 334. Accord with view of principal case, Hughes v.
Spratling, 3 Ala. App. 517, 57 So. 629 (1912) (letters, "L. S.") ; Buckingham v.
Orr, 6 Colo. 587 (1883) ; Caputo v. Di Loreto, 110 Conn. 413, 148 At. 367 (1930)
(emphasizing statute) ; Burkhalter v. Perry & Brown, 127 Ga. 438, 56 S. E. 631
(1907) (same); Manning v. Perkins, 86 Me. 419, 29 At. 1114 (1894) ; In re Pirie,
198 N. Y. 209, 91 N. E. 587 (1910). Contra: Langley v. Owens, 52 Fla. 302, 42
So. 457 (1906) (printed letters "L. S."; presumption of sealing; goes largely on
statute) ; Moats v. Moats, 72 Md. 325, 19 Atl. 965 (1890) ; Line v. Line, 119 Md.
403, 86 Atl. 1032 (1913) ; Osborn v. Kistler, 35 Oh. St. 99 (1878); Loraw v.
Nissley, 156 Pa. 329, 27 Atl. 242 (1893) (strong case) ; McLaughlin v. Braddy,
63 S. C. 433, 41 S. E. 523 (1902). See also Green v. Lake, 2 Mackey 162, 172
(D. C. 1882) (involving Mississippi note) ; Brown v. Jordhal, 32 Minn. 135 (1884).
81 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §98(1) and illustration; see North Carolina annotations, (1934) 13 N. C. L. REv. 67.
' Corbin, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 602,
603, although, of course, some minority views have been stated when they were
thought to represent the clearly superior rule.
10See Article, Seals (1867) 1 A-A. L. REv. 638.
Ingram v. Hall, 2 N. C. 193 (1795) ; Billig and Wunschel, supra note 7.
a It is usually stated that whether a given mark or attachment constitutes a
seal is a question for the court while the question of whether it was put on or was
adopted as such by the signer is a question for the jury. See Yarborough v. Monday, 14 N. C. 420, 421 (1832) ; Baird v. Reynolds, 99 N. C. 469, 6 S. E. 377 (1888).
Since recognition of scrawls and marks for seals, however, [see statutes so providing, supra note 1; also Henderson, J., in Yarborough v. Monday, 13 N. C. 493,
494 (1830); Hacker's Appeal, 121 Pa. 192, 15 Atl. 500 (1888) (holding that a
mark 1/8 inch long will serve) ], the first question has practically ceased to exist,anything will do if so intended and the sole question then becomes the second, i.e.,
if it was so intended. That is a fact question -butit is by no means in all cases a
proper jury question. The intent may be so clearly manifested on the instrument
that the court should decide it, as where there is a recital of' sealing or, it is be-
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it was proper to seek the actual intent of the signer as to whether he
meant it to be his seal. There was no clearly evident intent from the
mere signing, for the marks might be only flourishes; so likewise when
it was sought to make one seal do for more than one signature.1 3 It is
easy to see why that should be, too. In the one case the kind of mark,
in the other, its place, would suggest a question as to its intended import. But when a printed symbol containing the word "Seal" was used,
the presence of that word in plain English adjacent to each place of
signing would give rise to a natural inference that the self-explanatory
symbol was what it said it was 14 and that it was adopted like any other
part of a printed document would be if not cancelled.' 6 In other words,
even though intent is still determinative, it is objective intent, and only
one finding thereon is reasonable under the facts of the instant casethat the instrument was intended to be sealed. It follows that the trial
judge should direct such a finding or set aside a contrary one as against
the weight of the evidence. Of course, in cases where there is ambiguity there is a legitimate jury question. This easily distinguishes the
cases relied on by the court, where one scroll was claimed to be the seal
of two,1 6 and where, on a mutilated instrument, the question of the ex17
istence of any marks as a seal was obviously one of fact for the jury.
A sampling canvass of laymen tends to confirm the view just expressed. It seems that they quite generally understand that the printed
seal is a part of the instrument, legally efficacious for some purpose and
that it is adopted by signing before it. Of course, it argues nothing for
the opposing position that the signer does not know the full or correct
legal effect of the seal he finds and adopts. That would be still true if
there were a recital. And it is almost as certainly true of the words of
negotiability on the same instrument, yet these, beyond question he
adopts if he does not cancel them. One accepts and incorporates by
signing all plain, seemingly relevant matter connected with the instrulieved, likewise where the signature is placed before a mark including the word,
"seal." It would always be open to the defendant to show whether the mark was
wrongfully placed there after the signing. And usual equitable principles should
apply in case of mutual mistake. Cf. Lynam v. Califer, 64 N. C. 572 (1870),
where the seal was added through "mistake and ignorance."
"Yarborough v. Monday, 13 N. C. 493 (1830), 14 N. C. 420 (1832); Pickens
v. Rymer, 90 N. C.282 (1884).
'" See language of Gilfillan, C. J., in Brown v. Jordhal, 32 Minn. 135, 137 (1884),
as to presence of word "seal" in brackets as evidencing unmistakable intent to make
the symbol a seal.

I Loraw v. Nissley, 156 Pa. 329, 27 At. 242 (1893), that use of printed form
raises conclusive presumption of the adoption of all parts not cancelled before
signing. And see Oregon statute to the effect that "any -printed seal or scroll on
the instrument at the time of signing will be presumed to have been adopted by
the person signing his name before it." ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §9-703.

Note 13, supra.

11

Baird v. Reynolds, 99 N. C. 469, 6 S. E. 377 (1888).
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ment he signs. This proposition is so elementary that it hardly ever
finds direct expression but it is implicit in such doctrines as the fine
print exception 18 and the significance attached to the writing as evidence
of the parties' intention in the application of the parol evidence rule.' 9 ,
And the argument sometimes made that seals might be fraudulently
added 20 loses most of its weight when applied to a printed form, particularly in view of the present day skill in detecting differences of ink
21
and type.
Two considerations, moreover, are present with regard to negotiable
instruments that are not in the case of ordinary common law documents.
The first of these is that commercial paper should not be cluttered up
with unnecessary verbiage such as the non-commercial language of a
recital taken from common law deeds and covenants. 22 The second of
these considerations is that a long period of limitation is more justifiable
in the case of negotiable instruments than in the case of most other legal
engagements both written and oral. The universally recognized custom
is to surrender a bill or note when it is discharged 23 and the possibility of
fraudulent suits upon such instruments after the lapse of an unreasonable time is therefore diminished.
It may be silly to allow an informal mark carelessly annexed or
thoughtlessly adopted, to effect the same important differences in legal
'S 1 PAGE, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1920) §112. And see novel argument based on
that doctrine. People v. Mich. Ave. Trust Co., 242 Ill. App. 579, 596-597 (1926).
" That the parol evidence rule prevents "varying, contradicting or adding to" a
writing only when reasonable men would have intended it to embody the final and
complete agreement of the parties, see Gianni v. R. Russel & Co., Inc., 281 Pa. 320,
126 Ati. 791 (1924), and McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural
Device for Control of the Jury (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 365. Cf. 5 WIGMORE, EVMENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2430 that the test of intent is subjective. Of course, the
purport of the writing is cogerit evidence of intent. See 5 WIGMoRE, EVmENCE

(2d ed. 1923) §2430 (3).
In North Carolina, it seems that the rule prevents only contradiction and that
any intent is immaterial. Chadbourn and McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule in
North Carolina (1931) 9 N. C. L. REv. 151, 156-167. This view of the parol evidence rule would be an analogy for a holding that an instrument like the one in
the instant case is conclusively presumed to be sealed-that is, even objective intent
'i i
is immaterial.
1 DAN EI, NEG. INSTR. (7th ed. 1933) 32; In re Pirie, 198 N. Y. 209, 214, 91

N. E. 587 (1910).

Cf. Ingram v. Hall, 2 N. C. 193, 210 (1795).
(2d ed. 1929) 481-488.

OSBORN, QUEsTIoNED DOCUMENTS

" It is true that Chief Justice Gibson's "Courier without Luggage," [Overton
v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346, 347 (1846)] might in this day be more fittingly compared to
a luggage-laden red-cap. But what stipulations it has been found desirable to add

for business reasons are one thing; what are unnecessarily added by legal compulsion are another. The practice was to cut down on words and utilize implications.
Note the dropping of "for value received"; the absence of recitals about signing
and delivery like those in the language of common law documents, "signed, sealed

and delivered"; the bare form of a blank endorsement with its fully effectual
operation to transfer and bind-all mercantile abbreviations for mercantile paper.
NEGOTIA.BLE INSTRUMENTS LAw §74; N. C. CODE (1935) §3055.
N
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rights which the old-time elaborate and impressive sealing did.24 Sealing today, even with a preliminary printed recital, is hardly more than
a blind and inadequately comprehended equivalent of declaring consideration to be unnecessary 25 and enforceability to be lengthened. Yet
a statement in plain words to the same effect would hardly be permitted
26
to serve the purpose.
Perhaps such a statement should be sanctioned and even made the
exclusive way of accomplishing those objects, 2 7 or at the opposite extreme that the entire effect of private seals should be done away with
along with the seals themselves.2 8 The former course would assure a
wider understanding of what was legally accomplished; the latter would
remove the need for any special understanding. But either of these
departures would be recognized as a matter for legislative determination
so that existing rights might be protected.
Williams v. Turner, the instant case, departed from the rule apparently long supposed to be the law in this state and long acted upon as
such. 29 There is nothing unseemly about a court's acquainting itself
with existing lay ideas as to the state of the law and with the practices
built up upon such ideas, and in then considering the consequences to
business and private rights of a decision one way or the other,-espeSSee Decker, The Case of the Sealed Instrument in Illinois (1917) 1 ILL. L.
BuLL. 65-66, 173-174; Crane, The Magic of the Private Seal (1915) 15 CoL. L.
REv. 24; Ingram v. Hall, 2 N. C. 193, 203. But cf. Reeve, The Unifarm Written
ObligationsAct (1928) 76 U. oF PA. L. Rlv. 580.
' As to negotiable instruments, this is not included. See citations at the end of
note 1, supra.
'Cf. cases holding recital without seal insufficient. Annotations to REsrATmEzNT, CoNTRAcTs (1932) §96, (1934) 13 N. C. L. REv. 66; Note (1926) 4 N. Y.
L. Rav. 431. But a contrary rule exists by statute in some states. ALA. CODE
(Michie, 1928) §6847; MAss. ANN. LAws (Michie, 1932) c. 4, §9A; N. J. Laws
1931 c. 12 (applies only to conveyances of real property); S. C. CODE (1932)
§8694.
"ICf. the recital of intent to be bound as a substitute for consideration in acts
adopted in Pennsylvania and Utah. Reeve, The Uniform Written Obligations Act
(1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. RFv. 580; Note (1931) 9 N. C. L. Rv. 196.
"See statutes, supra note 1; Judge Crane, op. cit. mspra note 24, at 36. But ef.
contra, argument of Prof. Reeve, supra note 24, at 580, 581.
Sample forms of promissory notes used in North Carolina, not collected for
this purpose but already in hand for use as illustrative material in the course in
Bills and Notes in the Law School, show the following classifications: (Total
notes, 11); Forms having neither seal nor recital, 1, (Fidelity Bank, Durham);
having both seal and recital, 2, (First & Citizens Nat. Bk., Smithfield, Bank of
Chapel Hill) ; having seal but no recital (the type here in question), 8, (general
form in use at Asheville, and forms of Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., Greensboro, Bank of Wendell, Farmers & Merchants Bank, Wendell, First Nat. Bk.,
Washington, Central Bank and Trust Co., Asheville, N. C. Bank & Trust Co.,
Raleigh, Hood System Industrial Bank of Greenville). Furthermore, as to forms
set out in full in recent reported opinions, besides the one in the instant case, that
quoted in Davis v. Alexander, 207 N. C. 417, 177 S. E. ,417 (1934), has a seal but
no recital and is referred to throughout the opinion as 'the note under seal," while
that found in Hall v. Hood, Comr., 208 N. C. 59, 179 S. E. 27 (1935), shows neither
seal nor recital.
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cially when the law in the particular situation, as here, has not already
been cast in a fixed mould. As early, at least, as the 1700's that course
had the approval by conduct of so eminent a jurist as Lord Mansfield30 and there have been noteworthy examples ever since. If the
court in the instant case had followed that practice it is believed a
different conclusion would have been reached. At least in the case of
standard forms of negotiable instruments bearing printed seals clearly
described as such at the end of the signing lines, the intent of the signer
thereon ought to be regarded as sufficiently evident to require no jury
finding. Whether a like rule ought to apply to a printed "(L. S.)" in
a like place is somewhat more doubtful because of the element of ambiguity but it may be noted for what it is worth that a limited inquiry
among intelligent laymen shows a considerable impression that such an
insignia, so placed, means "Legal Seal."31
The General Assembly would be well occupied at its next session in
devoting some time to taking up anew the whole problem of seals and
sealed instruments, including those of corporations, and declaring an
appropriate state policy for the present day.
M. S. B.
Contracts-Exclusive Agency-Requirement as to Definiteness.
In an action for breach of contract plaintiff alleged an offer by
defendant automobile manufacturer to grant plaintiff an exclusive sales
agency if plaintiff succeeded in raising $40,000 additional capital. After
plaintiff had raised the $40,000 by a sale of its stock, defendant refused
to perform. Held, on demurrer, that the agreement was too indefinite
and uncertain to be enforced.'
The increasing prevalence of exclusive sales agencies as a means of
distributing manufactured products creates new problems which test the
usefulness of old common law rules of contract. The familiar formula
that to be enforcible an agreement must be reasonably definite and certain, 2 fails as an instrument of predictability. The types of agreements
which will be given or denied legal effect can be ascertained only by a
close examination of the provisions of agreements involved in the cases
where the formula is applied.3 Parties may enter into an enforcible
oSee CAMPBELL, LIVms OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES (1899) 120, note.
"If this notion is widespread enough, it should make no difference that it is
historically erroneous.
:Jordan v. Buick Motor Co., 75 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
2Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., 65 F. (2d) 1001 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933)
(Amount of goods not specified) ; 1 WILLisToN, CONTRACTS (1920) §37; RESTATEWiENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §32.

'Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Automobile Co., 201 Fed. 499 (C. C. A.

7th, 1912) (Model and price of cars not stated in agreement, but locality and time
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skeleton agreement, with details to be filled in during the course of performance, 4 if the agreement may be tested by an objective standard in
the event of a subsequent dispute as to terms.5 However, if it appears
that matters of substance have been left for future negotiations, recovery is usually denied upon the ground that, where the parties have not
come to a "meeting of the minds," the courts will not impose upon
them a contract they have not made. 6 A contract may be upheld as to
some matters, and denied legal effect as to others on the ground of
7
indefiniteness.
In the modern business world it would seem to be almost a necessity that parties to complicated sales agency contracts should not only
come to an agreement on such matters as quantity, sales price, commissions, duration, expenses, etc., but should also incorporate such items
into the written instrumentas a means of guiding their performance
during the life of the agreement, as well as to .reduce the possibility of
future litigation.8 Detail would seem to be the rule rather than the exception. A skeleton agreement invites trouble. Courts operating on the
stated) ; Nebraska Aircraft Corporation v. Varney, 282 Fed. 608 (C. C. A. 8th,
1922) (Definite in number but indefinite as to price and models) ; Wakem & McLaughlin Inc. v. Culver, 28 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928) (Customer's agreement to furnish manufacturer materials for gloves, limiting invoices to 5,000
dozen pairs weekly, and requiring manufacturer's expansion to that capacity did
not bind customer to furnish materials for definite quantity) ; Marble v. Standard
Oil Co., 169 Mass. 553, 48 N. E. 783 (1897) (Agreement for defendant to sell oil
cheaply enough for plaintiff to compete in territory held too indefinite) ; Jackson
v. Alpha Portland Cement Co., 122 App. Div. 345, 106 N. Y. S. 1052 (3d Dept.
1907); Brandenstein v. McGrann-Reynolds Fruit Co., 56 N. D. 201, 216 N. W.
576 (1927) (Uncertain as to price, quantity; territory not clearly defined, and
commissions indefinite).
'Southwest Pipe Line Co. v. Empire Natural Gas Co., 33 F. (2d) 248 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1929) ; Kirkley v. F. H. Roberts Co., 268 Mass. 246, 167 N. E. 289 (1929)
(Territory of sales agent depended upon future action).
I McIllmoil v. Frawley Motor Car Co., 190 Cal. 546, 213 Pac. 971 (1923) (Model
and price of new car not definite but could be rendered definite by evidence
aliunde) ; Varney v. Ditmars, 217 N. Y. 223, 233, 111 N. E. 822, 826 (1916) (Dissenting opinion of Cardozo, J.).
IANsoN, CoNTRAcTs (Corbin's 5th Am. ed. 1930) §55; see (1915-1916) 3 VA.
L. Rzv. 640; (1915-1916) 14 Micr. L. REv. 600.
"Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 Fed. 796 (D. Del. 1920) (Contract not definite as to time and quantity but large expenditures made and contract
was held good); E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-Reno Co., 64 F.
(2d) 224 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933) (Agreement making plaintiff sole state distributor
of manufacturer's products not void for uncertainty as to quantity) ; McCall Co.
v. Icks, 107 Wis. 232, 83 N. W. 300 (1900) (Number depended upon seller's
business and therefore in the contemplation of the parties).
8
Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Automobile Co., 201 Fed. 499 (C. C. A.
7th, 1912), cited note 3, supra; Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Co. Inc., 65 F. (2d)
1001 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933) (Terms and prices indefinite) ; George E. Wilcox Inc.
v. Shell Eastern Petroleum Products Inc., 283 Mass. 383, 186 N. E. 562 (1933)
(No obligation imposed upon plaintiff). See Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Gladding,
42 F. (2d) 440 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930) for definite and detailed contract.
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gradually waning laissez-faire theory of contract waste little sympathy
on a plaintiff who has suffered a loss as a result of his failure to insist
upon anything more than a loosely drawn agreement.' 0 However, the
unfortunate plight of such plaintiffs has occasionally moved courts to
grant some semblance of relief,' 1 in view of the fact that it is usually
the manufacturer who dictated the terms of the instrument to an agent
of limited bargaining power who was improvidently willing to take whatever was offered him. By such devices as implying that the agreement
shall endure for a reasonable time, 12 or that a unilateral agreement was
consummated,' 3 at least partial recompense is allowed to the agent.' 4
In the instant case the substantial reliance by plaintiff agent on the
promise of the defendant, with its resulting disastrous loss,'" gives rise
to; a feeling that the courts should have, if possible, overruled the demurrer. This is further substantiated by the fact that defendant's
demurrer admitted plaintiff's allegation that the agreement was to be in
effect for a reasonable time. The parties might have considered that
I .e., the practice of treating the parties as of equal bargaining power, a handsoff policy, in spite of actual inequality; see cases cited supra, note 6.
" Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Co. Inc., 65 F. (2d) 1001 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933),
cited note 8, supra.
1 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 Fed. 796 (D. Del. 1920), cited
note 7, supra (No inequality of bargaining power but heavy investment) ; Eastern
Terminal Lumber Co. v. Stitzinger, 35 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1928) (Dealer
could recover for stock required to be purchased in seller's company) ; Abrams v.
George E. Keith Co., 30 F. (2d) 90 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1929) (Contract indefinite as
to time, quantity, and price, and terminable by either party on reasonable notice.
Held, since no notice was given, dealer was entitled to recover on his investment) ; Garlock v. Montz Tire and Rubber Co., 192 Mich. 665, 159 N. W. 344
(1916) (Dealer could recover for tires which he had been required to purchase).
"Abrams v. George E. Keith Co., 30 F. (2d) 90 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1929), cited
note 11, supra (Contract indefinite as to time held to run for reasonable time) ;
Erskine v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 185 N. C. 479, 117 S. E. 706 (1923) (Dealer given
exclusive agency in certain territory; indefinite as to time; treated as continuing
for reasonable time).
" Brenard Mfg. Co. v. Miller & Robinson, 158 Miss. 892, 131 So. 274 (1930);
RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §90; CLARK, CONTPRACrS (4th ed. 1930) §10.
'"Emerson-Brantingham Co. v. Lyons, 94 Kan. 567, 147 Pac. 58 (1915) (Expenses recovered) ; Myer v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 156 Mo. App. 170, 136 S. W.
5 (1911) (Contract indefinite as to time; expenses paid. Held, if agent makes
expenditures in the matter of the agency he should have a chance to recoup them
or recover from principal); Hallstead v. Perrigo, 87 Neb. 128, 126 N. W. 1078
(1910) (Expenses recovered).
The existing cases in North Carolina seem to go in both directions. Thomas
v. Thomasville Shooting Club, 123 N. C. 285, 31 S. E. 654 (1898) (Where plaintiff
was to build barn in consideration for receiving patronage of shooting club, expenses to be paid by club, held void for indefiniteness). (But see dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.). Erskine v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 185 N. C. 479, 117 S. E.
706 (1923), cited note 12, supra (Dealer given exclusive agency in certain territory
and incurred certain expenses. Contract could be canceled at will of manufacturer.
Held, upon performance of condition, contract became clothed with valid consideration which relates back and makes the promise obligatory. Reasonable time
allowed).
' The facts reveal that plaintiff was subsequently declared a bankrupt.

90

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

the agreement was a preliminary negotiation, which, upon execution,
would obligate defendant to enter into a subsequent, detailed agency
contract.
On the other hand, there can be little doubt that the tactics employed
'by plaintiff showed little business foresight. It was a corporation already engaged in the automobile business, and therefore presumably
aware of the fact that it was assuming a disproportionate risk in raising
$40,000 in reliance upon a promise as indefinite as that of defendant.
The situation of the parties would seem to indicate, not a substantial
inequality in bargaining power, but rather foolhardiness on the part of
the plaintiff. It would also seem difficult to find a basis upon which to
calculate damages suffered for which the defendant should be liable.
J. D. MALLONEE, JR.
Descent and Distribution-Doctrine of Worthier Title
in North Carolina.
Under the doctrine of worthier title, a devise to the heir is void if
he takes the same nature and quality of estate by the will that he would
have taken by descent had the testator died intestate, owing to the
preference of the common law for title by descent.' At common law
the doctrine was a rule of law; there was no election in the heir to take
by descent or by purchase, because the descent was immediately cast
upon him, and the devise was considered as having no operation at all,
thus forcing the heir-devisee to take by descent. 2 This hoary dogma
arose out of the efforts of medieval landlords to preserve their feudal
rights,3 and of creditors of the ancestor to reach property which at that
time, if taken by devise, would have been immune.4 This rule was
abrogated by statute in England in 1833 ;5 it still exists in some of the
"1

MouRDcAi,

LAw LEcTURES

(2d ed. 1916) 648;

PowELL,

AN

ESSAY

UPON

TME LEARNING OF DEVIsES (3d Am. ed. 1822) 284; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY

(2d ed. 1920) §487.

2University v. Holstead, 4 N. C. 289 (1812).

'Campbell v. Herron, 1 N. C. 381 (1801). Where the owner of land was permitted to devise his land, the overlord was deprived of the fruits of his seigniority,
the consequence of descent.
11 MORDECAI, LAw LECTUES (2d ed. 1916) 648. "This rule was made for the
protection of creditors, because after making bonds whereby they bound themselves and their heirs to pay money, the obligors would devise their lands to their
heirs, and, as such devises constitute the heirs purchasers, so to speak, they got
the land without having to pay the bond-not being liable on the bond of the
ancestor except when they acquired real estate by descent from such ancestor.
This pitiful evasion of an honest debt was upset by the rule above stated." It is
no longer necessary to apply the rule for this purpose because present statutes
make the -property of the decedent liable for his debts whether devised or not.
'3 & 4 William IV, c. 106, §3 (1833). This statute declared that when any
land should be devised by a testator dying after December 31, 1833 to his heir,
the devise should operate and the heir should take as devisee by purchase and not
by descent as heir.
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American states, however, without the support in its operation of the
reasons on which it was founded. 7 The purpose of this note is to consider the application of the doctrine in North Carolina.
Where the devolution of ancestral property in North Carolina is
concerned, it is necessary to determine whether the devisee takes by
descent or by purchase. Purchased estates-in the technical sense of
the word "purchase" 8 -descend to the nearest relations, irrespective of
the paternal or maternal line; whereas, descended estates and certain
purchased estates (such as the doctrine of worthier title converts into
descended estates) descend to the nearest relations of the blood of the
ancestor from whom the estate was transmitted.9 Thus, where the
testatrix devised land, transmitted to her by descent from her father,
to "her heirs at law," the heirs took the same estate under the will that
they would have taken by descent had the testatrix died intestate. Therefore, under the doctrine of worthier title, the devise was void and "her
heirs at law" took by descent and not by purchase. Consequently the
fourth canon of descent' 0 governed the devolution of this property, as
though the testatrix had died intestate, to restrict the inheritance to
those relations of the testatrix who were of the blood of the original
ancestor."
If the testator devises his land to his sole heir at law, the devise will
fail of operation and the heir will take by descent ;12 and it is not necessary that the entire estate be devised to the heir, as the operation of the
14
rule depends upon the quality's of the estate rather than the quantity.
0Harper & Heckel, The Doctrine of Worthier Title (1930) 24 ILL. L. REv. 627,
642. The doctrine has been "asserted, applied, or referred to in some phase or
another, in the District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio,

Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Tennessee."
7

Campbell

v. Herron, 1 N. C. 381, 384 (1801); 1 MORnaCA,

LAW Lacnruas

(2d ed. 1916) 648, 649.
8The word "-purchase" is used in law in contradistinction to "descent," and
means any mode of acquiring real property other than by the common course of
inheritance. One takes property by purchase through the act of parties as contra.distinguished from taking by descent by operation of law.
'Burgwyn v. Devereux, 23 N. C. 583, 586 (1841).

"'N. C.CODE (1935) §1654(4).

"Yelverton v. Yelverton, 192 N. C. 614, 135 S. E. 632 (1926).
Caldwell v. Black, 27 N. C. 463 (1845) ; Poisson v. Pettaway, 159 N. C. 650,
75 S. E. 930 (1912).
"'By "quality" of estate is meant the manner of enjoyment whether solely,
jointly, in common, or in coparcenary. See Yelverton v. Yelverton, 192 N. C.
614, 135 S. E. 632 (1926), cited note 11 supra.
' Wilkerson v. Bracken, 24 N. C. 315 (1842).
The testator devised to his
wife and his daughter (the daughter being the sole heir at law) "between them
,equally to be divided." The rule was held applicable although the daughter received only one half of the land instead of all of it as she would have received
by descent had the testator died intestate. However, she took the same "quality"
of estate, that is, as sole tenant.
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Furthermore, if the testatator devises to his wife for life with remainder
in fee to his children, the children, instead of taking an estate in remainder under the devise, take an estate in reversion by descent, although the limitation to the heirs be charged with an encumbrance. 15
Perhaps it may seem that the rule should not apply here because the
wife gets a life estate in the whole property under the devise and the
children get only a remainder; while, by descent, the wife would have
gotten dower, a life estate in only one-third of the land, and the heirs
would have received a present possessory interest in two-thirds of the
land and a remainder in the balance. It must be noted that the test for
the rule, however, is to "strike out of the will the particular devise to
the heir, and then, if without that he would take by descent exactly the
same estate which the devise purports to give him, he is in by descent
and not by purchase."' 1 In the present case the heirs get the full title
after the life estate just as though there had been no limitation over to
them, in which event there is a reversion to the testator's estate and
thence to his children by descent. So, according to the above test, the
devise over gives the heirs what they would have got in the absence of
the will and it is obvious that the rule should apply.
On the other hand, the doctrine does not apply in North Carolina
where the testator alters the estate, limiting it in a different way from
that in which it would have passed by descent, 17 as where the testator
devises to the heirs of his son, instead of to the son himself who survives the testator and who is his heir at law ;18 or where the testator
devises his entire estate to only one of his four children who are capable
of taking. 19 Similarly, a devise at common law to the second son instead of to the first son, who was the sole heir under the rule of primogeniture, was not affected by the rule ;20 likewise, a devise at common
law to the wife for life with the remainder to the three daughters of the
'University v. Holstead, 4 N. C. 289 (1812). Testator devised to his wife for
life, remainder to be equally divided between his two daughters. By making the
estate equally to be divided between his two daughters, they were bound to take

as tenants in common, the same "quality" of estate which they would have taken
by descent had the testator died intestate; therefore, they took by descent and not
'bypurchase under the will.
."6 KENT, COMMENTARIES 506, citing CROSLEY, TREATISE ON WMLS (London
1828) 101.
17 University v. Holstead, 4 N. C. 289, 291 (1812).
"McKay v. Hendon, 7 N. C. 209 (1819); Osborne v. Widenhouse, 56 N. C.
238 (1857) ; Peel v. Corey, 196 N. C. 79, 144 S. E. 559 (1928).
"Ross v. Toms, 9 N. C. 9 (1822). Testator devised to his wife for life, remainder to his son, A. Testator was survived by other children, B, C, and D. The
rule did not apply because as devisee A did not get the same quality of estate that
be would have gotten had testator died intestate. A received a sole tenancy by the
devise whereas he would have received a tenancy in common by descent shared in
by B, C, and D.
' Burgwyn v. Devereux, 23 N. C. 583 (1841).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
testator was not within the scope of the rule because under the devise
the daughters took as joint tenants21 instead of taking as coparceners,
the quality of estate which they would have taken at common law had
the testator died intestate. 2 2 Not only must the heirs take the same
estate in order to come under the rule, they must take that estate in the
same subject-matter as well.2 3

Thus, where the testator owns Blackacre

and Whiteacre, and devises the first tract to A and the latter to B, they
being his heirs, the rule does not apply because under the will A and B
take as tenants in severalty whereas they would have taken as tenants
24
in common of both the tracts had there been no will.

Instead of being abrogated by statute in North Carolina as in England, 2 5 the doctrine is incorporated into and extended by the fourth

canon of descent to embrace estates derived by gift and settlement, as
well as by devise. 2 6 In Poissonv.Pettaway27 Judge Brown recited that
"at common law, a devisee who takes the same quality and nature of
estate that he would have taken by descent had the testator died intestate, takes by descent, owing to the preference of the common law for
the title of descent," and then he declared that "our statute puts a similar devise between such parties on the same footing with the descent."
It is thought that Judge Brown did not thereby restrict the operation of
the doctrine to ancestral property, but simply called attention to the fact
that so far as ancestral property was concerned where there are no lineal
descendants, the doctrine has been made a part of the statutory law of
this state. It seems clear that the statute did not confine the operation
of the rule to land which the devisor himself had inherited, because,
where a father bought land and devised it to his heir at law, the devise
' This case was decided prior to the enactment of the statute which would
have made the daughters take as tenants in common unless there was a clear intention expressed in the will to make them take a different quality of estate. See
University v. Holstead, 4 N. C. 289, 291 (1812), cited note 4 supra.
I Campbell v. Herron, 1 N. C. 381 (1801). It must be noticed that the distinction between this case and University v. Holstead, 4 N. C. 289 (1812), cited
note 15 supra, is that, in the latter case, the testator was careful to provide that
the land should be equally divided between his daughters, thus making them take
as tenants in common; whereas in the present case, the devise was to testator's wife
for life with remainder to the three daughters of testator, thus making them take
as joint tenants instead of as coparceners, the quality of estate which they would
have taken by descent at common law.
1 MoRDEcAI, LAw LECTuREs (2d ed. 1916) 648.
Raiford v. Peden, 32 N. C. 466 (1849).
2 3 & 4 William IV, c. 106, §3 (1833), cited note 5 supra.
'N. C. CODE (1935) §1654(4). "On failure of lineal descendants, and where
the inheritance has been transmitted by descent from an ancestor, or has been
derived by gift, devise, or settlement from an ancestor, to whom the person thus
advanced would, in the event of such ancestor's death, have been the heir or one of
the heirs, the inheritance shall descend to the next collateral relations, capable
of inheriting, of the person last seized, who were of the blood of such ancestor,
subject to the two preceding rules."
=159 N. C. 650, 651, 75 S. E. 930 (1912).
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was void in that it gave the heir the same estate which he would have
28
received by descent in the absence of the will.

It does not seem that a devise to A for life with remainder to the
heirs of the testator would be affected by Consolidated Statutes, §1739,20
which provides that a limitation by deed, will, or other writing to the
heirs of a living person should be construed as a limitation to the children of such person. This statute is probably designed to cover a devise
to the heirs of a living third person, and, in case of a deed, to the heirs
of the grantor ° as well as to the heirs of a living third person. It
should not apply to the heirs of the testator himself because, when the
will takes effect, the testator is necessarily dead and his children could
not be classified as "the heirs of a living person." If for some reason,
however, the statute should be held applicable to the heirs of the testator,
it would not prevent the operation of the rule of worthier title because
the testator's children would be his heirs and they would take the same
estate by the devise that they would have taken by descent; and if, perchance, the testator should not be survived by children to take under the
statute, the limitation over to them would fail under the operation of
that statute, 8 ' and the testator's collateral heirs would take the reversion
by way of descent from the testator.
What effect does the operation of the doctrine of worthier title have
upon Consolidated Statutes, §4138,32 which voids any devise or bequest
'Wilkerson v. Bracken, 24 N. C. 315 (1842) ; see Raiford v. Peden, 32 N. C.
466 (1849), cited note 24 supra, where the testator bought the lands and devised
to his daughteis in severalty. The doctrine of worthier title was not applied in
this case due to the fact that under the devise the heirs took a different estate in
quality from that which they would have taken by descent in the absence of a
will; not because the land had not been inherited by their father as ahcestral
property.
IN. C. CODE (1935) §1739.
' Thompson v. Batts, 168 N. C. 333, 84 S. E. 347 (1915). T conveyed land to
his wife for life with remainder to the heirs of her body by him, and provided
that, in the event of no such issue, the remainder should be to the heirs of the
grantor. Section 1739 was applied to make the children of the grantor by a former marriage (upon the non-happening of the contingency) take as purchasers
of the remainder under the deed. It is readily seen that the statute should apply
in a conveyance to the heirs of the "grantor" because it is quite possible for his
children to be the "heirs of a living person," whereas a devise by the "testator"
to his heirs would not come under the statute because the children of the testator
could not possibly be the "heirs of a living person," the testator being dead when
the will takes effect.
" Under the statute, supra note 29, a limitation, whether by deed or will in
North Carolina to the heirs of a living third person would fail if that person
should not have children to take the estate. By analogy, supposing that the statute
should apply to the heirs of the testator; a devise to such heirs under the statute
would fail if the testator had no children. This being true, there would be a
reversion in the testator just as though he had not made a limitation over after
the life estate, and the heirs at law of the testator would take this reversion by
descent unless it had been disposed of by a residuary clause in the will.
IN. C. CoDE (1935) §4138.
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to any person who is an attesting witness? It would not affect bequests
because the doctrine is not concerned with personal property; yet it is
conceivable that the doctrine would affect that part of the statute dealing
with devises to the heirs of the testator. Suppose, for instance, that the
testator is survived by his two sons, A and B, his sole heirs, and that
he devised Blackacre to them as tenants in common. Let us suppose also
that his son A was an attesting witness. Under the ancient dogma,
which is a rule of law and not of construction, 33 the devise to both A
and B would be void because they take the same quality of estate by the
devise that they would have taken by descent had the testator died
intestate. Since A was a witness, the statute in question would void
the devise to him although it would permit him to prove the will. Which
would prevail in this situation, the statute or the doctrine of worthier
title? It is the opinion of the writer that, under the doctrine of worthier
title, the devise was void ab initio, and, therefore, there would be no
devise upon which the statute could operate. Although the will might
be proved, it seems that both A and B should take Blackacre by descent
just as though the testator had died intestate. It is submitted that this
would be a most excellent application of the doctrine in order to protect
those heirs who, in ignorance of the above statute, attested the wills of
their ancestors with no thought other than to accommodate the testator.
Certainly no harm would result because the heir would receive only that
to which he was entitled by descent and which the testator attempted to
give him by devise; if the heir received more, whether by the exercise
of undue influence or not, the rule would not apply to protect him from
the operation of the statute.
No North Carolina cases have been found in which the doctrine of
worthier title was invoked to determine the rights of third parties. Problems of this nature have arisen in other jurisdictions and will likely arise
in this state, especially in the administration of decedents' estates. For
instance, suppose a testator devised Blackacre to his heir at law and
Whiteacre to his friend, and that there is a deficiency of personal assets
with which to pay the debts of the deceased. It would follow logically
under the doctrine of worthier title that Blackacre should be resorted to
first for the payment of debts, in exoneration of the estate in Whiteacre
devised to the friend.3 4 A Massachusetts court so held, treating BlackUniversity v. Holstead, 4 N. C. 289 (1812).

"The following statutes would be involved in such a situation in North Carolina: N. C. CODE (1935) §87 ("When any part of the real estate of the testator
descends to his heirs by reason of its not being devised or disposed of by the will,
such undevised real estate shall be first chargeable with payment of the debts, in
exoneration, as far as it will go, of the real estate that is devised, unless from the
will it appears otherwise to be the wish of the testator") ; and §88 ("If, upon the
hearing of any -petition for the sale of real.estate to pay debts, under this chapter,
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acre, devised to the heir, as undevised realty on the ground that the heir
took the same estate by devise that he would have taken by descent. 85
However, a more equitable result was reached by an English court which,
although it recognized that creditors may proceed against the land devised to the heir in priority to the other devise, held that the doctrine
"does not afford a sufficient reason for saying that the burden of the
debts should not be borne ratably by the devisees, although one of them
is heir," and further, that "the heir is entitled to contribution from the
other devisee to the extent in which his estate may be exhausted by
debts."3 6 The court justified this departure from the strict logic of the
rule on the ground that the devise to the heir was not a mere nullity as
between the heir and the other devisee, and that effect should be given to
the intention of the testator so far as possible to protect the natural object of the testator's bounty as against the other devisee, who, under a
strict application of the doctrine, would profit simply because he was
not the heir of the testator. The doctrine may be resorted to as a bar
to certain will contests. For instance, where the heir takes the same
estate by devise that he would have taken by descent in the absence of a
will, it has been held that the heir lacks an interest sufficient to permit
him to contest the will because such heir could neither gain nor lose if
he succeeded in upsetting the will.37 Similarly, where the will disposed
of the entire estate to the heirs in the same manner in which it would
have descended, the will has been held a nullity as to the disposition of
the property and therefore not subject to contest.88
It is apparent that the doctrine of worthier title, shorn of the purposes which brought it into existence, prevails in North Carolina in its
common law form and that it has 'been incorporated into and extended
the court decrees a sale of any part that may have been specifically devised, the

devisee shall be entitled to contribution from other devisees, according to the

principles of equity in respect to contribution among legatees. And the children
and issue provided for in this chapter shall be regarded as specific devisees in

such contribution.")

According to the effect of these statutes, if the problem

alluded to in the body of this note should arise in North Carolina, it seems that
the result reached by the English Court in Biederman v. Seymour, 3 Beav. 368
(Rolls Ct. 1841), supra note 36, would apparently obtain.
"Ellis v. Page, 61 Mass. 161 (1851). This court resorted to the realty devised

to the heir, in such fashion as to make it subject to the doctrine of worthier title,
for the payment of cash legacies as .well as for payment of the debts of the
decedent.
'Biederman v. Seymour, 3 Beav. 368 (Rolls Ct. 1841). The testator died before the doctrine of worthier title was abolished by statute in England in 1833,

supra note 5.

Thompson v. Turner, 173 Ind. 593, 89 N. E. 314 (1909).
nWheeler v. Loesch, 51 Ind. App. 262, 99 N. E. 502 (1912). Although the
will is spoken of as a nullity, only the devises to the heirs are nullities and the

will is perfectly valid to pass title to the personalty and to the land devised in a
different way than it would have gone by descent had the testator died intestate,
and for the appointment of the executor.
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It has been applied most often in
by our fourth canon of descent.
determining the devolution of ancestral property where the heir took
the same estate by devise that he would have taken by descent, and then
died intestate, survived only by collateral relatives of equal degi'ee on
both the paternal and maternal side and both claiming the estate as heirs'
at law. If the heir took by purchase, all the relations would take; if he
took by descent under the operation of the doctrine of worthier title,
only those heirs of the blood of the transmitting ancestor would take.
THOMAS H. LEATH.

Federal Practice--Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto on
the Evidence.
Plaintiff brought an action in a federal court in New York to re-.
cover damages for personal injuries incurred while he was in the defendant's employ. At the close of the evidence, the defendant moved
for a dismissal of the complaint because the evidence was insufficient
to support a verdict for the plaintiff, and also moved for a directed
verdict in its favor on the same ground. The trial court reserved its
decision on both motions, submitted the case to the jury subject to its
opinion on the questions reserved, and received a verdict for the plaintiff. Thereafter, the court held the evidence sufficient, the motions illgrounded, and entered judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict. On
appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals held the evidence insufficient and
reversed the judgment with a direction for a new trial.- Defendant
obtained certiorari in the Supreme Court 2 which modified the judgment
of the Circuit Court to direct a dismissal on the merits, and the judgment as so modified was affirmed. 3 The practice of reserving rulings on
questions of law and taking verdicts subject to the ruling was a wellestablished practice at common law and carried with it the authority to
make such ultimate disposition of the cause as the court might see fit.
Thus, since the Seventh Amendment4 to the Federal Constitution refers
to the rules of the common law in 1791, at the enactment of the AmendIN.C.CoDE (1935) §1654(4).
'Redman v. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc., 70 F. (2d) 635 (C. C. A. 2nd,

1934).

-'Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 293 U. S. 541, 55 Sup. Ct. 89,

79 L. ed. 88 (1934).
Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 55 Sup. Ct. 890 (U. S. 1935).
U. S. CoNsT. Amend. VII ("In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.").
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ment, 5

this procedure was not a re-examination of the findings of fact
by a jury and a rendering of judgment contrary thereto such as would
make *itinvalid under that Amendment.
Originally at common law a judgment non obstante veredicto could
be granted only on the application of the plaintiff0 under matter apparent of record;7 hence, it was just one species of judgment on the
pleadings, but available only to the plaintiff in the action. This rule has
been relaxed, however, to allow either the plaintiff or the defendant to
make such motion, and the rule as modified has been recognized by the
federal courts.8 Whereas, at common law such a judgment could be
granted upon matter apparent of record, it could not be granted because
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. This rule of the
common law has been changed in some states by statute so that either
the trial or the appellate court may grant judgment non obstante
veredicto in certain circumstances where the verdict is found to be unsupported by the evidence. 10 The practice in such states was for a time
approved and followed in the federal courts," but it appears now settled
that a federal court may not enter such judgment regardless of such
statutes. The leading case on this point is that of Slocum v. New York
Life Insurance Company, the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Van Devanter, holding that this practice of re-examining the
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 580, 43 L. ed. 873
(1899) (Amendment VII, U. S. Constitution, refers to the common law of England, the rules of which allow a re-examination of the findings of the jury only

by a new trial granted by the trial court, or -when ordered by an appellate court
for error in law).
' German Ins. Co. v. Frederick, 58 Fed. 144 (C. C. A. 8th, 1893); U. S. v.
Gardner, 133 Fed. 285 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904).
Sternberg v. First National Bank, 280 Fed. 863 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922).
s U. S. v. Gardner, 133 Fed. 285 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904).
'Perkins v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 199 Fed. 712 (C. C. A. 9th, 1912).
1012 PURl. PA. STAT. (1929) §681 ("Wherever, upon the trial of any issue, a
point requesting a 'binding instruction has been reserved or declined, the party presenting the point may within the time prescribed for moving for a new trial, or
within such other or future time as the court shall allow, move the court to have
all the evidence taken upon the trial duly certified and filed so as to become part of
the record, and for judgment non obstante veredicto upon the whole record; whereupon it shall be the duty of the court, if it does not grant a new trial, to so
certify the evidence, and to enter such judgment as should have been entered
upon that evidence, at the same time granting the party against whom the decision
is rendered an exception to the action of the court in that regard. From the
judgment thus entered either party may appeal to the Supreme or Superior Court,
as in other cases, which shall review the action of the court below, and enter such
judgment as shall be warranted by the evidence taken in that court."); N. Y.
Cwvm PRAcTicE AcT (1931) §§459, 461.
'" Keiper v. Equitable Life Ass. Society, 159 Fed. 206 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1908);
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. McCune, 174 Fed. 991 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1909); FriesBreslin Co. v. Bergen, 176 Fed. 76 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1909); Smith v. Jones, 181
Fed. 819 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1910) ; Cornette v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 195 Fed. 59
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1912).
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findings of the jury was not recognized at common law, and hence was
2
invalid under the Seventh Amendment.'
The principal case appears to make an exception to the broad rule
laid down in the Slocum case and its effect is to recognize the constitutional validity of at least one method of obtaining judgment non ob,stante veredicto on the evidence in the federal courts. Thus, the practical effect of the instant decision is that a litigant in a federal court
can secure judgment non obstante veredicto based on the evidence, and
avoid a new trial, only when the state in which the federal couft is sitting has adopted, by statute or by judicial approval, the common law
practice of reserving rulings. The difference thus drawn, between a
judgment non obstante veredicto on the evidence based on a reserved
ruling on a motion for a directed verdict and such judgment based on a
motion first made after a verdict is taken, is an insubstantial one.'1Z
Such a reservation is but a formality of interest to the historian of
procedure. While it is better to have the form of Ndgment non obstante
veredicto on the evidence in federal courts recognized by the instant case
than none, can not the Supreme Court provide for litigants a broader
relief from the needless expense and inconvenience of repeated new
trials? Two methods of providing such relief appear available. The
Supreme Court could abandon the "deadhand" of the common law in
its interpretation of the Seventh Amendment and hold that the Amendment does not prohibit a judgment non olbstante veredicto on the ev=228 U. S. 364, 33 Sup. Ct. 523, 57 L. ed. 879 (1913) (the defendant's motion
for a directed verdict having been denied, the court entered judgment on a verdict
for the plaintiff; the Circuit Court of Appeals, relying upon the Pennsylvania
statute, reversed this judgment with a direction to enter judgment for the defendant. Held, judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals modified so as to direct a
new trial); Pedersen v. Del., L. & W. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146, 33 Sup. Ct. 648, 57
L ed. 1125 (1913) ; Young v. Central R. Co. of N. J., 232 U. S. 602, 34 Sup. Ct.
451, 58 L. ed. 750 (1914); Myers v. Pittsburg Coal Co., 233 U. S. 184, 34 Sup. Ct.
559, 58 L. ed. 906 (1914); Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Dubois Electric Co., 253
U. S. 212, 40 Sup. Ct. 514, 64 L. ed. 865 (1920) ; Eberhart v. U. S., 204 Fed. 897
(C. C. A. 8th, 1913) ; Evans v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 205 Fed. 638 (S. D"
Pa. 1913); Engomeon v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. P, Co., 210 Fed. 897 (C. C. A.
8th, 1914); Union Pac. R. Co. v. U. S., 219 Fed. 437 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915) ; Glynn
v. Krippner, 60 F. (2d) 406 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932).
'"The rule in the Slocum Case has been subjected to much criticism: Thorn-.
dyke, Trial by Jury in the United States Courts (1913) 26 HIv. L. Rv. 732
("The declaration of a majority of the court is a public misfortune, because it
destroys a simple means of enforcing, without the expense, delay, and uhcertainty
of a new trial, a right to which the decision shows that a party was entitled at
the trial."); Glynn v. Krippner, 47 F. (2d) 281 (D. C. Minn. 1934) (Federal
District Judge Sanborn, disregarded the opinion of the Supreme Court in the
Slocum Case, and granted a judgment twit obstante veredicto on the evidence in
favor of the plaintiff, saying, "What possible justification is there for denying the
court the right, after trial and verdict, to grant the judgment which they should
have granted during the trial, where only questions of law were involved? . .,
The only thing that is lacking is the presence of a jury, which performs no function whatever, so far as the questions of law are concerned.").
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idence, on a motion first made after a verdict is taken, thus leaving the
federal courts free to conform to the prevailing state practice sanctioning such procedure. 14 On the other hand, if it is thought that the common law test of the meaning of the right hy trial by jury should be
retained, the Supreme Court might, under the recent congressional
grant of authority to make rules of procedure to govern the federal
courts in actions at law,' 5 promulgate a rule providing for reserved rulings on motions during the trial, thus making available in all the federal
courts, 'irrespective of the practice of the state wherein sitting, the procedure for judgments non obstante veredicto, on the evidence approved
by the instant case.
KENNETH W. YOUNG.

Gaming-Conflict of Laws-Statutory Liability of Winner
for Penalties.
In Georgia there is a statute which authorizes the loser in a gambling
transaction to bring suit at any time within six months for the recovery
of the amount lost, and if he neglects to bring this action within the
allotted period any person may sue the winner and recover the amount
involved in the wager, one-half for himself and one-half for the county
educational fund.' With this statute as the basis of his action the plaintiff alleged that in 1930 the defendant entered into a gambling contract
in Fulton County, Georgia, with Lloyds Insurance Co. of London, England, the forfeit to be $2500 in case "Bobby" Jones won the four major
golf championships during that year; that Jones won the four championships; that the money was paid; ahd that although six months had expired the loser had not brought suit to recover its loss. The appellate
court reversed the lower court's ruling which sustained the defendant's
demurrer on the ground that the allegation that the contract was made
in Georgia was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction.2
"'It has been -pointed out that such an interpretation is an unnecessary one:
Scheidt v. Dimick, 70 F. (2d) 558, 564 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934) (Mr. Justice Morton,
dissenting, said, "I do not think that the Constitution prohibits improvements in
the machinery for administering justice or restricts our procedural methods to
those in use in the days of hand looms and sailing ships.") ; Funk v. U. S., 290
U. S. 371, 384, 54 Sup. Ct. 212, 216, 78 L. ed. 369, 376 (1933) (Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the majority, said, "An adoption of the common law in general
terms does not require, without regard to local circumstances, an unqualified application of all its rules; the rules have been controlling in this country only so
far as they are suited to and in harmony with the genius, spirit and objects of
American institutions; the rules of the common law considered proper in the
eighteenth century are not necessarily so considered in the twentieth.").
1148 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S. C. A. §723b (1934 Supp.).
1
GA. CoD ANzr. (Michie, 1926) §4256.
2 Tatham v. Freeman, 180 S. E. 871 (Ga. 1935).
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The act involved in the principal case was adopted in 1765, and it
seems to have been derived from the English statute of 8 Anne, c. 14. s
Similar statutes, some of which authorize the informer to recover treble
the amount involved in the illegal transaction, have been enacted by
other American jurisdictions.4 Collusion between the informer and the
loser for the purpose of increasing the latter's recovery has been held
an adequate defense for the winner,5 and a fictitious suit between the
winner and the loser will not bar the informer's right of action.8 Where
the disabilities of married women have 'been removed, it is considered
proper for the wife of the loser to bring the action as informer.7 In
New York, however, the only persons competent to sue as informers are
8
those who are charged with the care of the poor in the community.
Usually the informer is required to divide his recovery with some county
agency.9 Further, as the chart will indicate, gambling is generally regarded as a criminal offense, 10 and many states by statute authorize the
loser to recover his loss by means of a civil action against the winner. 1
The decision in the principal case is predicated upon a point of procedure, but the facts motivate an inquiry along different lines. Where
was this contract made-in England or in Georgia? Assuming that it.
was made in England where this type of betting is legal, could the
defendant be subjected to the penalties of this Georgia statute? From
the brief statement of facts it is impossible to determine whether the
defendant in Georgia made an offer to wager via the mails, by cable, or
through an agent, or whether he accepted the offer to wager on specified
terms which was circulated throughout the world by the insurance company. If the latter possibility were the fact the court might consider
the contract as made in Georgia, since the last act necessary to complete
it was performed there. Thus as the lex loci contractus would control,
'Neal v. Todd, 28 Ga. 334 (1859) ; Cole v. Applebury, 136 Mass. 525 (1884).
'For example, ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 38, §310.
'Kiser v. Walden, 198 I1. 274, 65 N. E. 116 (1902) ; Cole v. Applebury, 136
Mass. 525 (1884).

' Staninger v. Tabor, 103 Ill. App. 330 (1901).
"Johnson v. MdGregor, 157 Ill. 350, 41 N. E. 558 (1895). For cases decided
prior to the removal of the married women's disabilities, see Moore v. Settle, 82
Ky. 187 (1884) ; Spiller v. Close, 110 Me. 302, 86 Atl. 173 (1913).
1 CoNs. LAws OF N. Y. (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, §989.
'For example, ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 38, §310.
" For example, N. C. CODE (1935) §4430. At common law gambling was not
considered illegal. Ex parte Pierotte, 43 Nev. 243, 184 Pac. 209 (1919).

"For example, ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §43-102. In the absence of statute the
loser in a betting transaction cannot recover the money or property lost. F. M.
Davies Co. v. Porter, 248 F. 397 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918) ; Sofas v. McKee, 100 Conn.
541, 124 AtI. 380 (1924). In North Carolina even though we have one statute
which renders gambling illegal and another which declares all gambling contracts
to be void, it is impossible for the loser to recover the money or property lost at
gambling. Dunn v. Holloway, 16 N. C. 322 (1829).
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care of poor
may sue. Treble
recovery.

Fine--Five
No
times ain't won

Oregon's

Yes. Loser may
recover double
ain't lost.

No Statute

Yes

Misdemeanor
Fine-$500

No

Snuth
Carolina's

Yes. Stat. of limit Yes. Recover
-3 mos.
treble amount
Minimum ain't:
of loss.
$50.

Yes

Fine--$100
Jail-30 days

No

Virginia's

Yes. Stat of limit. No Statute
-3 mo.
Minimum ain't:
$5.

Yes

Fine-$100
Jail-60 days

No

(The above states were selected for purposes of illustration. No complete survey was
intended.)
"CouP. LAWS OF FLA. (1927) §§7666, 7672, and 8311; ComP. LAWS OF FLA.

(Supp. 1934) §4151(74). Pari mutual betting is permitted at licensed tracks in
this state.
IGA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) §§4256 and 4260; GA. PENAL CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1926) §392.
"AILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 38, §§298, 309, 310, and 316 (10).

Pari

mutual betting is permitted at licensed tracks in this state.
'In Nevada certain types of gambling games may be played at licensed houses.
A violation of this law is a felony. However, the act specifically provides against
a construction making it illegal for persons to participate in social games for
drinks, smokes, or which involve prizes valued at two dollars or less. Pari mutual
betting at licensed tracks is permitted. NEv. Comp. LAWs (Hillyer, 1929) §§10201
and 10205.
IN. C. CODE (1935) §§2142, 2143, and 4430.
'Any person -who wins more than $25 by gambling during a 24 hour period is
subject to a fine of five times the amount won, which may be recovered in a civil
action by the persons charged with the care of the poor in the county 'Where the
offense occurred. A similar penalty may be applied where the winner has forced
the loser to pay his losses. Where the loser has neglected to exercise his privilege
of recovering those sums which he has lost at gambling, the persons charged with
the care of the poor may briiig a civil action against the winning gambler. If the
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the informer might properly sue under the Georgia statute. The problem is more difficult if the facts should indicate that the defendant made
an offer to bet which the insurance company accepted in England. In
several cases where money was transmitted by telegraph from one state
to another for placement as a wager the courts have held that the
transaction was completed in the state where the wager was accepted
and placed. Consequently if gambling was legal where the bet was
placed the gambler in the other state could not be penalized under its
laws even though gambling was considered illegal there. 22 However,
these cases were expressly disapproved in Biscayne Kennel Club v. Taylor2 3 where the owner of a Florida dog racing track sought an injunction
in the Federal District Court to restrain interference by local officers
with his scheme to receive wagers at the track and transmit them by
telegraph to Cuba for placement. The petition was denied upon the
ground that the plan entailed an obvious attempt to evade the state laws
prohibiting gambling. The Supreme Court of Kentucky employed similar reasoning in Commonwealth v. Crass24 where the defendant's demurrer to the jurisdiction of the court was overruled and his conviction
for gambling sustained even though the facts indicated that he had
crossed into Tennessee to make the wager on an election. Further, the
dictates of public policy usually deny the enforcement of gambling contracts by the courts of a state whose statutes frown upon the practice of
gaming even though it is agreed that the contract was made in a jurisdiction where gambling was legal.2 5
From these authorities it appears that the gambling transaction
which crosses a state line represents an exception to the theory of lex
loci contractus,and, as applied to the facts of the principal case, it would
seem that the plaintiff-informer could bring his action under the Georgia
action is brought under this theory the recovery is limited to treble the amount won.
CoNs. LAWs or N. Y. (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, §§989, 990, 992, 995, and 996.

ORE.
CoDE

CODE ANN. (1930) §§14-739,
oF LAws OF S. C. (Michie,

14-743, 43-101, and 43-102.
1932) §§1738, 1744, 6308, 6309, 6311, and

6312.

'VA.

CoDm ANN. (Michie, 1930) §§4686, 4780, 5558, and 5559.
' This type of statute usually provides that self-incrimination will not excuse
the witness and he is protected from prosecution by reason of any testimony
which he may give. For example, N. C. CoDE (1935) §2143.

1McQuesten v. Steinmetz, 73 N. H. 9, 58 Atl. 876 (1904) ; Lescallett v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 878, 17 S. E. 546 (1893). But cf. Ex parte Lacy, 93 Va. 159,
24 S. E. 930 (1896).
=23 F. (2d) 871 (S. D. Fla. 1927).
180 Ky. 794, 203 S. W. 708 (1918). Other cases in -point are: Brand v. Cornmonwealth, 110 Ky. 980, 63 S. W. 31 (1901); Commonwealth v. Collins, 181 Ky.
319, 204 S. W. 74 (1918) ; Tarleton v. Baker, 18 Vt. 9, 44 Am. Dec. 358 (1843).
' Maxey v. Railey & Bros. Banking Co., 57 S. W. (2d) 1091 (Mo., 1933);
Gooch v. Faucett, 122 N. C. 270, 29 S. E. 362 (1898) ; Note (1928) 5 N. Y. U. L.
REv. 69.
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statute even though the contract were made in England. Certain steps
were taken by the defendant in Georgia which resulted in a violation of
the Georgia law. After all, these statutes providing punishments and
penalties for gambling were enacted for the purpose of stamping out
this vice, and in view of this policy, the law should not present the
opportunity of easy evasion which exists if the gambler is allowed to
escape merely because the bet was actually accepted in another state.
N. A. TOWNSEND, JR.

Municipal Corporations-Power to Regulate TaxicabsRequirement for Indemnity Bond.
A city was given power by its charter "to license and regulate all
vehicles operated for hire in the city." Held, the city was without
authority to require taxicab operators to provide liability insurance or
bond to protect the public against negligent operation of the cabs. 1

In reaching this result the court based its decision on the principle
that a municipal corporation possesses only those powers expressly
granted, necessarily implied, or essential to its declared objects. 2 But
the great majority of courts, although reciting this formula, have reached
results contra to that of the instant case and have upheld similar ordinances under grants of power no more extensive than that involved in
the principal case. Ordinances requiring indemnity bonds of taxicab
operators have been upheld under grants of power to "collect a license
tax on and regulate hacks," 3 "to regulate the use of streets, '

4

"to reg-

ulate every description of carriages which may be kept for hire," 5 and
In the light of these
"to license, tax, and regulate public hackmen."'
decisions the court in the principal case seems to adopt an unnecessarily
I State v. Gulledge, 208 N. C. 204, 179 S. E. 883 (1935). The same ordinance
was before the court in State v. Saseen, 206 N. C. 644, 174 S. E. 142 (1934), and
was held invalid on constitutional grounds. For a comment attacking that decision
see (1935) 13 N. C. L. REv. 222. The constitutional objections were removed from
the ordinance before the instant case arose.
'Detroit Citizens Street Railway Co. v. Detroit Railway, 171 U. S. 48, 18 Sup.
Ct. 732, 43 L. ed. 67 (1897) ; Smith v. New Bern, 70 N. C. 14 (1874) ; 1 DILLON,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) §237.
'Ex parte Counts, 39 Nev. 61, 153 Pac. 93 (1915).
'City of New Orleans v. Le Blanc, 139 La. 113, 71 So. 248 (1915) ; Fenwick
v. City of Klamath Falls, 135 Or. 571, 297 Pac. 838 (1931) ; Greene v. City of
San Antonio, 178 S. W. 6 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Ex parte Sullivan, 77 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 72, 178 S. W. 537 (1915); Ex parte Bogle, 78 Tex. Crim. Rep. 1, 179
S. W. 1193 (1915) ; Note (1926) 25 MIcH. L. R-v. 81. In Ex parte Cardinal, 170
Cal. 519, 150 Pac. 348 (1915), an ordinance requiring indemnity bond of taxicab
operators was upheld under the city's implied -police power to regulate the streets;
the ordinance was described as being "purely regulatory in its nature."
IWillis v. City of Fort Smith, 121 Ark. 606, 182 S. W. 275 (1916) ; Commonwealth v. Kelley, 229 Ky. 722, 17 S. W. (2d) 1017 (1929); Ex parte Dickey, 76
W. Va. 576,85 S. E. 781 (1915).
1 Sprout v. City of South Bend, 198 Ind. 563, 153 N. E. 504 (1926).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

105

7

strict construction of charter powers in order to deny a city power to
adopt a socially desirable ordinance.8
In these days of constantly expanding governmental functions it becomes increasingly necessary for the state to delegate to municipal corporations ever larger powers of control over matters of local interest.
If the ultra-strict construction of charter powers expressed in the principal case is followed, it will not be possible by general language to give
municipal corporations that plenary power which may be desired in a
particular field. Instead, it will be necessary to include in city charters
a particularized statement of each item of power granted. This would
produce two undesirable results: first, it would necessitate that municipal charters be tremendously bulky and detailed documents; and second, in spite of the greatest legislative foresight, in every such attempt
at enumeration there is always danger of omission of things intended
to be included. 9
Adherence to the strict construction of the principal case will go far
to paralyze cities attempting to operate under existing charters. Many
city ordinances now in force would have to be declared invalid if attacked.10 In passing new ordinances the cities may be impelled, in order
to insure their validity, to run to the state for particular grants of
7State eV rel. Johnson v. Bates, 161 Tenn. 211, 30 S. W. (2d) 248 (1930),

cited by the court in the principal case to support its decision, is distinguishable.
There the charter granted power to the municipality "to regulate the running of
automobiles." It was held that this referred to traffic rules regulating the speed
and movement of automobiles on the city streets and did not confer power upon
the city to exact security for the benefit of passengers using the automobiles.
The charter provision involved in the instant case was "to regulate all vehicles,"
not "to regulate the running of vehicles."
"Where in its nature an
B The idea of requiring a bond is not a new one.
occupation is apt to cause injury to others, such a bond has frequently been required. And the jitneysy present such an obviously -proper case for an application
of this principle that this requirement has been unhesitatingly indorsed." Note
(1916) 38 HARv. L. REv. 437.
SThis is particularly true since the rule of interpretation that the specific
enumeration of certain powers impliedly excludes those not mentioned would be
applied in such a case. Grand Rapids v. Hughes, 15 Mich. 54 (1860) ; State v.
Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424 (1856).
A logical application of the reasoning of the instant case would result in
invalidation of many types of ordinances passed under general grants of power.
As an illustration, by the terms of N. C. CODE (1935) §2623-6 "a city or town is
authorized to grant upon reasonable terms franchises for public utilities." Under
authority of this statute a city, in an ordinance granting a franchise to a street
railway company, included a provision fixing the maximum rate which could be
charged for carrying a -passenger within the city. CODE OF CITY OF CAmRToE
(1931) §435d(f). Under the reasoning of the principal case such a provision
might be invalid because the power to enact it was not in specific terms granted
to the city. Also, the instant case would seem to directly affect the validity of
ordinances of the cities of Asheville, Greensboro, Winston-Salem, and Raleigh
requiring taxicab operators to file indemnity insurance or bond. ORDINANCE OF
CITY OF AsnEvLL, April 20, 1933; ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF GREENsBORO
(1930) c. 37, §7; ORDINANCES OF WINSTON-SALEM (1926) §178; CoNsoLmATED
ORDINANCES OF CIT OF RALEIGH (1929) c. 15, §26.
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power, thus further consuming the time of the legislature with purely
local problems. A more reasonable construction of charter powers
would obviate these harmful results.
F. M. PARKER.
Taxation-Trusts--Power to Tax Interest of Beneficiary.
An Ohio statute1 levied a tax on all investments from which income
is derived, excepting interests in land, but expressly not excepting equitable interests in land divided into shares evidenced by transferable certificates. Plaintiff, a resident of Ohio, was the owner of transferable
land trust certificates in seven separate trusts, 2 four of which consisted

of office building properties in Ohio, the other three outside of Ohio.
Plaintiff claimed that his certificates represented an interest in land, and
that the tax on the Ohio trusts violated the uniformity clause of the
Ohio constitution3 because the land had already been taxed against the
trustee, and in the case of the out-of-state trusts, the tax was a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution as a tax on
land outside the jurisdiction of Ohio. The Supreme Court of Ohio
sustained the tax in each instance.4 The decision was reversed by the
Supreme Court of the United States, three justices dissenting.5
There is presented here the question of the power of a state to tax
the beneficiary's equitable interest in a trust, and whether that power
may be affected by the nature of the trust and the composition of the
res.
"'Investments' defined. §5323. The term 'investments' as used in this title includes the following: . . . Annuities, royalties and other contractual obligations
for the periodical payment of money and all contractual and other incorporeal
rights of a pecuniary nature whatsoever from which income is or may be derived,
however evidenced, excepting (1) patents and copyrights and royalties derived
from each, (2) interests in land and rents and royalties derived therefrom, other
than equitable interests divided into shares evidenced by transferable certificates."
115 LAws OF OHio 552 et seq. (1933).
2 The trusts were all similar but entirely separate. There was no connection
between managements. Parcels of land were severally conveyed to trustees, each
trustee holding but one parcel and, by the terms of the trust agreement, undertaking to hold and manage the property, to receive the income and pay it over
ratably to the certificate owners. If the lands were sold under the existing options the proceeds were likewise to be ratably distributed. Each owner of a certificate was registered on the books of the trustee, but had no right to possession
or partition, and had no control over the trustee. The certificates were freely
transferable. For more detailed information on the usual set-up for Ohio land
trust certificates see Goldman and Abbott, Land Trust Certificateswith Relation to
Ohio Law (1928) 2 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 255.
Land and improve,Art. XII, §2 of the Constitution of Ohio provides, "...
ments thereon shall be taxed by uniform rule according to value." Apparently
this view had been previously accepted by the Attorney General of Ohio. See the
principal case, infra note 5. 55 Sup. Ct. 800, 803, 79 L. ed. (Ad. opinions) 863,
866. See also OHIO GENERAL CODE (1929) §§710-140 (d).
'Senior v. Braden, 128 Ohio 597, 193 N. E. 614 (1934).
1 Senior v. Braden, 55 Sup. Ct. 800, 79 L. ed. (Ad. opinions) 863 (U. S. 1935).
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In a trust of intangibles the income and corpus may be taxed against
the trustee by the state of his domicile.6 The income may be taxed
against the beneficiary by the state of his domicile.7 A few states,
' Corpus: Price v. Hunter, 34 Fed. 355 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1888); Higgins v.

Commonwealth, 126 Ky. 211, 103 S. W. 306 (1907); Welch v. City of Boston,
221 Mass. 155, 109 N. E. 174 (1915). If the trust is held by more than one
trustee and there is diversity of citizenship between the trustees, then the general
rule is that the corpus will be taxed pro rata according to the number of resident
trustees. MacKay v. City & County of San Francisco, 128 Cal. 678, 61 Pac. 382
(1900) ; Court v. Gill, 50 Md. 377 (1878) ; Hardy v. Inhabitants of Yarmouth,
88 Mass. 277 (1863). New York follows this rule by statute, and it applies to
Kellog v. Wells, 182 N. Y. 314,
executors as well as trustees. People ex reiL.
74 N. E. 878 (1905) (trustees); People ex rel. Moller v. O'Donnell, 183 N. Y.
9, 75 N. E. 540 (1905) (executors). Before the statute apparently the New York
rule had been otherwise. People ex rel. Barrow v. Coleman, 119 N. Y. 137, 23
N. E. 488 (1890) (Perhaps distinguishable on the grounds that the resident
trustees were non-active, the active trustees and the beneficiaries were non-residents, and the certificates for the property were kept out of the state) ; People ex
rel. Day v. Barker, 135 N. Y. 656, 32 N. E. 252 (1892). Contra: Goodsite v. Lane,
139 Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905) (Where one trustee had a residence in Ohio
but was not active there, the other trustee and the cestuis were non-residents, the
property certificates were kept out of Ohio. Held not taxable by Ohio . . .
"Where this tax has been sustained, either the trust estate, or the beneficiary, or
the trustee as trustee, was receiving benefits from the state, for which it was only
fair the trustee should pay."). Massachusetts, by statute, Croker v. City of Malden,
229 Mass. 313, 118 N. E. 527 (1918). If both trustee and beneficiary live in the
same state, the state may tax the trust property against the beneficiary instead of
the trustee, though apparently most states tax the trustee. Mayor, et al, of
Baltimore v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 97 Md. 659, 55 Atl. 316 (1903) ; Hathaway
v. Fish, 95 Mass. 267 (1866); cf. Davis v. Macy, 124 Mass. 193 (1878) (where
resident trustee was taxed for pro rata interest of non-resident beneficiaries, resident beneficiaries being taxed at their domicile) ; Ellet v. Commonwealth, 132
Va. 136, 110 S.E. 358 (1922) (where the court said it made no difference whether
the tax was assessed against the non-resident trustee or the resident beneficiary).
On the question of the right to tax a non-resident trustee, this case is overruled
by Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S.83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59, 74 L. ed.
180 (1929). Trust property may be taxable against a trustee for state and county
taxes when it is not for borough taxes. Borough of Carlisle v. Marshal, 36 Pa.
397 (1860) (trustee domiciled in Pennsylvania, beneficiaries domiciled in New
York). The executor of an estate is taxed on the intangible property he holds by
the place of his appointment regardless of his individual residence, or the residence of the testator or cestuis, or the location of the property certificates. Mc116, 65 N. E. 711 (1902) ;
Clellan v. Board of Review of Jo Davies County, 200 Ill.
Commonwealth v. Peebles, 134 Ky. 121, 119 S.W. 774 (1909) ; Tafel v. Lewis,
75 Ohio St 182, 78 N. E. 1003 (1906) ; William's Executor, 102 Va. 778, 47 S.E.
867 (1904). In general see Beale, Jurisdictionto Tax (1919) 32 HA. L. REv. 587,
619-623; Note (1928) HAR. L. Rxv. 511; 2 COOLBY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924)
§§469, 470; Goodrich, CONmIcT oF LAws (1927) §54.
Income: Hutchins v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 272 Mass.
422, 172 N. E. 605 (1930) ; People ex iel. Bank of America v. Gilchrist, 244 N. Y.
Wis. Trust Co. v. Widule, 164 Wis. 56,
56, 154 N. E. 821 (1926); State ex reil.
159 N. W. 630 (1916).
Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12, 40 Sup. Ct. 417, 64 L. ed. 739 (1920). Cf.
the attitude taken toward Maguire v. Trefry, supra, by the Court in the principal
case, supra note 5, 55 Sup. Ct. 800, 803, 79 L. ed. (Ad. opinions) 863, 866, Mr. Justice McReynolds speaking for the majority: ".

.

. The opinion accepted and fol-

lowed the doctrine of Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S.189, 47 L. ed. 439, 23 S.Ct.
277, and Fidelity & C. Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54, 62 L. ed. 145, 38
S. Ct. 40, L. R. A. 1918C, 124. Those cases were disapproved by Farmers Loan
& T. Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S.204, 74 L. ed. 371, 50 S.Ct. 98, 65 A. L. R. 1000.
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notably Maryland, Massachusetts, Vermont and Virginia, have also
taxed a resident beneficiary on the corpus where the trustee was a nonresident." It would appear that this taxation of the corpus against the
beneficiary could not be sustained since, under the decision of Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia,9 the corpus has its situs for taxation at
the residence of the trustee. But whether the beneficiary's equitable interest in the corpus of the trust will be recognized as a subject for taxation in addition to the legal interest of the trustee is an issue which does
not seem to have been squarely presented to the Supreme Court of the
United States. In the Safe Deposit Case Mr. Justice Stone pointed out
in his concurring opinion that the tax in issue was levied directly against
the corpus of the trust and not against the beneficial equitable interest
of the cestui que trust. He suggested that a tax on this latter interest
might be valid.10 The exact issue, however, seems to have been preThey are not in harmony with Safe Deposit & T. Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83,
74 L. ed. 180, 50 S. Ct. 59, 67 A. L. R. 386, and views now accepted here in respect
to double taxation. . .

."

Mr. Justice Stone speaking for the dissent: ". .. . The

fact that it is now thought by the Court to be necessary to discredit or overrule
Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12, 64 L. ed. 739, 40 S. Ct. 417, supra, in order to
overturn the tax imposed here, should lead us to doubt the result, rather than the
authority which plainly challenges it, and should give us pause before reading
into the Fourteenth Amendment so serious and novel a restriction on the vital
elements of the taxing power." Cf. Rowe v. Braden, 126 Ohio 533, 186 N. E.
3928 (1933).
Maryland: Humbird v. State Tax Commission, 141 Md. 405, 119 Atl. 157
(1922); McCeney v. County Commissioners, 153 Md. 25, 137 Atl. 291 (1927);
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Gibbs, 166 Md. 364, 171 Ati. 37 (1934)
(apparently overruling the two previous cases without mentioning them). Massachusetts: The leading case in Massachusetts is Hunt v. Perry, 165 Mass. 258,
43 N. E. 103 (1896). See also, Bates v. Boston, 59 Mass. 93 (1849); Dorr v.
Boston, 72 Mass. 131 (1856); Hathaway v. Fish, 95 Mass. 267 1866); Davis v.
Macy, 124 Mass. 193 (1878); Kenny v. Stevens, 207 Mass. 358, 93 N. E. 586
(1911). Vermont: City of St. Albans v. Avery, 95 Vt. 249, 114 Atl. 31 (1921).
Virginia: Selden v. Brooke, 104 Va. 832, 52 S. E. 632 (1905) ; Wise v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 693, 95 S. E. 632 (1918); Ellet v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 136,
110 S. E. 358 (1922) ; Trust Co. of Norfolk v. Commonwealth, 151 Va. 883, 141
S. E. 825 (1928), rev'd by Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83,
50 Sup. Ct. 59, 74 L. ed. 180 (1929). Contra: City of Augusta v. Kimball, 91 Me.
605, 40 Atl. 666 (1898) ; Anthony v. Caswell, 15 R. I. 159, 1 Atl. 290 (1885).
'280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59, 74 L. ed. 180 (1929).
"See also City of Augusta v. Kimball, 91 Me. 605, 40 Atl. 666 (1898) : "They
[the tax assessors] did not assess a tax directly against these annuitants [residents
of the taxing State] for the annuities payable to them, nor for any sums due them
or to come to them under the trust. They undertook to assess directly against
the defendants [the non-resident trustees] a tax upon the corpus of so much of
the estate thus held by them in trust as as held to provide the annuities for the
two [resident beneficiaries] which amount the assessors calculated to be 16/55 of
the whole property scheduled under that trust.... We do not hold, however, that
the assessors ... cannot assess a tax directly against the annuitants resident in
Augusta for their annuities or other interests arising out of the property or trust."
The majority of the court in the Safe Deposit Case declined to consider this issue
at all, and decided the case on the grounds that the corpus, for purpose of taxation,
had its situs in Maryland at the domicile of the trustee and where the certificates

NOTES AND COMMENTS

109

sented in a recent Maryland case," where the tax was levied on the
beneficiary's equitable interest in a foreign trust of intangibles, computed by capitalizing the income. The Maryland Court of Appeals, relying on Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, held the tax invalid on

the ground that, for purposes of taxation, there was no middle ground
2
between income and the value of the property constituting the trust.'
The court apparently rejected the distinction made by Mr. Justice
Stone.'
The corpus of the trust in the principal case was composed entirely
of real property. There was no question of the power of the state in
which the land was located to assess and tax it against the trustees. The
tax on the beneficiary was not an income tax, on which basis it might
14
have been sustained, but it was a property tax measured by income.
The majority opinion, treating the trust as a pure trust and applying
the doctrine of Brown v. Fletcher,'" held the tax void, but did not say

that the plaintiff had no taxable interest. The holding was that the
beneficiary's interest was an in rem interest in the res,'6 hence an interest in land, and, with regard to the out-of-state trusts, was beyond
the jurisdiction of Ohio; and with regard to the Ohio trusts, the levy
would subject the realty to double taxation contrary to the uniform rule
of the Ohio constitution.1 7 There is left undecided the question of taxfor the property were located, and the tax was void as an attempt to tax property

outside of the jurisdiction of the State.
' Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Gibbs, 166 Md. 364, 171 At. 37 (1934).
"Certiorari denied, Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Gibbs, 293 U. S.

559, 55 Sup. Ct. 71, 79 L. ed. 91 (1934).
"Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59, 74 L. ed.

180 (1929).
" Ohio does not have an income tax, but the taxpayer, owner of intangibles,
may elect to file a verified copy of his federal income tax return in which case
the amount of such income would be taken as the assessment of his investments
yielding income, in lieu of the assessments thereof as otherwise prescribed for
such property, 115 Ohio Laws 559 et seq. (1933) §§5372-3. In a state having an
income tax there would appear to be no reason for not taxing the income from a.
domestic trust. The income from a foreign trust could be taxed under the decision
of Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12, 40 Sup. Ct. 417, 64 L. ed. 739 (1920). It
was not claimed that the tax here was an income tax. It .purported to be a tax
on intangible property measured by income, and was so treated by both the
Supreme Court of Ohio and the Supreme Court of the United States.
235 U. S. 589, 35 Sup. Ct. 154, 59 L. ed. 374 (1915).
16 For conflicting views on this -point, see articles by Stone and Scott in (1917)
17 CoL. L. Rxv. 269 and 467, cited in the principal case.
" If such a separate interest should be recognized, then its situs for taxation
might be controlled by the principles of the instant case. If the interest of the
beneficiary is an in rem interest in the res, partaking of the nature of the res,
and the corpus of the trust consists of intangibles, then the beneficiary's interest
would appear to be intangible, and hence taxable at his domicile according to the
conventional doctrine of mnobilia sequuntur, personam; or it might acquire a business situs. Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133, 20 Sup. Ct. 585, 44 L,- ed.
701 (1900); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395, 27 Sup.
Ct. 499, 51 L. ed. 853 (1907) ; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors of New
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ation of the beneficiary's interest by a state which is not hampered by a
state constitutional uniformity rule.
The dissenting opinion adopted a functional approach, emphasized
the analogy of the land trust certificates to corporate stock certificates,
and held they were a new and different legal interest in land, enjoying
benefit and protection from the state, and should be subject to taxation
under the statute.' 8 This attitude is not without precedent. Business
trusts and corporations have been subjected to similar treatment for
several purposes. The federal income tax law has imposed the same
tax upon business trusts and corporations. 19 The Supreme Court of
the United States has classed them with corporations in denying them
them "privileges and immunities" of an individual.20 Under state decisions the business trust has been held to be a separate legal entity,2 1
Orleans, 221 U. S.346, 31 Sup. Ct. 550, 55 L. ed. 762 (1911). If the res consists
of tangible personalty having a fixed situs, it would appear that the beneficiary's
interest might be taxable only at such situs regardless of his own domicile. Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36, 50 L. ed. 150
(1905) ; Frick v. Penn, 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 69 L. ed. 1058 (1925). If
the corpus consists of realty, as in the principal case, it could be taxed only by
the state where situated, but that state, having a right to tax all the interest in the
land, might be able to provide for taxing part of it against the beneficiary, with
a corresponding deduction in the amount assessed against the trustee, as with
mortgages. Saving & Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S.421, 18 Sup.
C. 392, 42 L. ed. 803 (1898).
11The justification for the corporation tax is said to rest on the privilege and
benefit derived from the use of the corporate device created and maintained by
the state. The same argument could be made for exacting the tax on the trust
device, since it is only by virtue of the laws and protection of the state that the
trust can be maintained and enforced.
I "Hecht v. Malley, 265 U. S.144, 44 Sup. Ct. 462, 68 L. ed. 949 (1924) ; BurkWaggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U. S. 110, 46 Sup. Ct. 48, 70 L. ed. 138
(1925). For holdings under previous statutes, cf. Eliott v. Freeman, 220 U. S.
178, 31 Sup. Ct. 360, 55 L. ed. 424 (1911) ; Crocker v. Malley, 249 U. S.223, 39
Sup. Ct. 270, 63 L. ed. 573 (1919). Rommel, Tax Liability of Business Trusts
(1929) 7 NAT. INco E TAx MAG. 14 (distinguishing Crocker v. Malley and Hecht
v. Malley, supra).
wHemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537, 48 Sup. Ct. 577, 72 L. ed. 978 (1928).
(Cf.the attitude of Mr. Justice McReynolds, in this case, 277 U. S. at 550, 48
Sup. Ct. at 579, 72 L. ed. at 984: "Whether a given association is called a corporation, partnership, or trust, is not the essential factor in determining the powers of a state concerning it. The real nature of the organization must be considered. If clothed with the ordinary functions and attributes of a corporation, it
is subject to similar treatment." The majority opinion in the principal case, also
written by Mr. justice McReynolds, neglected entirely the similarity between the
business trust and the corporation, although the point was stressed by both the
dissent and the Supreme Court of Ohio.) In the same case below, 238 Mich. 508,
213 N. W. 867 at 872 (1925), the Supreme Court of Michigan said: "These
entities come to this state masquerading as 'pure trusts,' claiming the right as
disclosed -by their so-called declarations of trust to here exercise the 'powers or
privileges of corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships,' and to
here engage in pure business activities usually engaged in by corporations and
until of late never engaged in by trustees.. . . It is the duty of this court to look
beyond the form to the substance, to strip them of their finery, and to apply the
constitutional and statutory definitions of corporations to them."
2 Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 128, 225 Pac. 1045 (1924).
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subject to Blue Sky Laws, 22 and subject to service by publication as a
foreign corporation. 23 It has also been required to conform to regulations governing the corporation before being allowed to do business
within a state, 24 and where there was failure to comply, the members
have been held personally liable as partners. 25 Technically a distinction
can be drawn, but it would seem to be a formal one, for apparently the
trust device here was being employed to effect the same business purposes as the corporate device, and the evident intention of the Ohio
legislature was to impose on the two types of investments, represented
by trust certificates and stock certificates, the same property tax burden.
The corporation and trustee are subject to income and property ta.
Stockholder and beneficiary may be subject to income tax, and since the
stockholder may also be subject to property tax on his investment in
corporate shares it would not seem less equitable to subject the ben26
eficiary to property tax on his investment in land trust certificates.
It appears that the decisions do not preclude a tax on the equitable
interest of the beneficiary of a trust if, as a matter of tax policy, the
court should deem it advisable. 27 However, in view of the recent trend
of decisions toward the elimination of double taxation,28 it is probable
-Reiley v. Clyne, 227 Ariz. 432, 234 Pac. 35 (1925) ; Wagner v. Kelso, 195
Iowa 959, 193 N. W. 1 (1923) ; Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins, 107 Kan. 153, 190
Pac. 601 (1920); People v. Clum, 213 Mich. 651, 182 N. W. 136 (1921). Cf.
Malley v. Bowditch, 259 Fed. 809 (C. C. Q. 1st, 1919) (business trust held liable
for federal stamp tax on "certificates of stock of an association, company, or
corporation").
v. U. S. Mexico Oil Co., 110 Kan. 532, 204 Pac. 754 (1922).
2Harris
" McClaren v. Dawes Electric Sign Mfg. Co., 86 Ind. App. 196, 156 N. E. 584
(1927) ; Weber Engine Co. v. Alter, 120 Kan. 557, 245 Pac. 143 (1926) ; State v.
Hinkle, 126 Wash. 581, 219 Pac. 41 (1923) ; State v. Paine, 137 Wash. 566, 243
Pac. 2 (1926). Cf. Liverpool & London Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U. S. 566,
19 L.ed. 1029 (1871).
such a
'Wiley v. Howggson Corp., 90 Fla. 343, 106 So. 408 (1925) ("....
so-called trust ... is nothing but a veiled and futile effort to avoid the liabilities
of a co-partnership and acquire the privileges and immunities of a corporation
without complying with the corporation laws of the state . . .") ; McClaren v.
Dawes Electric Sign Mfg. Co., 86 Ind. App. 196, 156 N. E. 584 (1927); Weber
Engine Co. v. Alter, 120 Kan. 557, 245 Pac. 143 (1926). Cf. Williams v. Boston,
208 Mass. 497, 94 N. E. 808 (1911) (Massachusetts trust held taxable as a partnership.) But cf. Williams v. Milton, 215 Mass. 1, 102 N. E. 355 (1913).
Query if a distinction should not be made between business trusts, with
equitable interests evidenced by transferable certificates, and pure testamentary
trusts with no certificates.
" If it is desired to avoid an additional tax, why not eliminate the tax on the
trustee who holds only empty legal title, the real and ultimate ownership being in
the beneficiaries.
"Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36,
50 L. ed. 150 (1905) ; Frick v. Penn, 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 69 L. ed. 1058
(1925) ; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U. S. 567, 47 Sup. Ct. 202,
71 L. ed. 413 (1926) ; Brooke v. City of Norfolk, 277 U. S. 27, 48 Sup. Ct. 422, 72
L. ed. 767 (1928) ; Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct.
59. 74 L. ed. 180 (1929) ; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204,
50 Sup. Ct. 98, 74 L. ed. 371 (1930) ; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup.
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that the Court will be reluctant to recognize another taxable interest, and
is likely to adopt the view taken by the Maryland Court that, for purposes of taxation, there is no intermediate ground between the income
and the value of the property held by the trustee.
FRANKLiN S. CLARx.

Torts-Inducing Breach of Contract-Malice.
Plaintiff contracted to sell land to B. Defendant, who held a deed
of trust on the land, induced B to breach his contract by falsely informing him that plaintiff could not pass good title and by promising to sell
the land to him after the pending foreclosure proceedings for an amount
less than that stated in plaintiff's contract. Plaintiff sued for malicious
interference with his contract and was non-suited. Held, judgment
affirmed. Since defendant had a right to compete with plaintiff, the
question of malice was immaterial, for it could not make an act unlawful which in essence was lawful.'
The right to maintain an action against a third person for maliciously
inducing another to break his contract with the plaintiff has long been
recognized in this state.2 Though there was no indication at first that
the rule would be extended beyond the field of employment contracts, it
was later held that an action would lie for maliciously inducing the
breach of any contract.8 This is the majority rule today.4
North Carolina, however, has at times receded from this position,
and at present the state of the law is uncertain. Doubt was first thrown
upon the early cases in 1909 when the court said that generally no action
could be maintained for inducing breach of contract, since the consequence is only a broken contract for which the party injured may sue.5
Ct 436, 74 L. ed. 1056 (1930) ; Beidler v. South Carolina, 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct.
54, 75, L. ed. 131 (1930) ; First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S.312, 52 Sup.
Ct 174, 76 L. ed. 313 (1932).
'Holder v. Atlantic Joint Stock Land Bank, 208 N. C. 38, 178 S.E. 861 (1935).
'Haskins v. Royster, 70 N. C. 601 (1874) (employment contract).
'Jones v. Stanly, 76 N. C. 355 (1877) (contract to haul goods).
'Dade Enterprises v. Wometco Theaters, 160 So. 209 (Fla. 1935) ; Caverno v.
Fellows, 286 Mass. 440, 190 N. E. 739 (1934); Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 113
N. J. Law 582, 175 Atl. 62 (1934) ; Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216 (Q. B. 1853),
a leading case which is the forerunner of all cases allowing recovery for inducing
breach of employment contracts. For a collection of the cases, see Note (1933)
84 A. L. R. 43. For detailed treatments of the subject, see Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations (1928) 41 HARv. L. REV. 728; and Sayre, Inducing
Breach of Contract (1923) 36 HARv.L. R.-v. 663.
'Swain v. Johnson, 151 N. C. 93, 65 S.E. 619 (1909). "To this rule there are
but two generally recognized exceptions-one where servants and apprentices are
induced from malicious motives to leave their masters before the term of service
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A comparatively recent case, however, again recognizes that the action
will lie.6 In the present case, the court, after apparently recognizing
the right to maintain the action in a proper case, appends a quotation
from a treatise on torts7 in which it is said that generally no action will
lie for inducing breach of contract. If the court accepts this broad
statement as the law, then it is decisive of the issue.
The decision in the instant case, however, seems to be based on the
idea that plaintiff's injury, if any, was the result of lawful competition
and that therefore defendant was justified in inducing the breach of
contract. While the doctrine of freedom of competition may be invoked to justify defendant's acts when both plaintiff and defendant are
engaged in similar enterprises," it is difficult to see how it could be
applied in the present case, for plaintiff was a borrower and defendant
was a lender (land bank). Since the only object of defendant should
have been to realize the amount loaned by it plus interest, the policy of
allowing it to compete with its customers may well be doubted.
Assuming, however, that the proposition laid down by the court is!
sound, should the presence of malice make a difference? The point is
often made, as in the instant case, that malice unconnected with a legal
wrong will not support an action. 9 Thus if defendant's act in inducing
a breach of contract between plaintiff and a third person is lawful, there
is no need for inquiring into his motive. The fallacy in this reasoning
is obvious. If the act of defendant in inducing a breach of contract is
unlawful, that in itself will support an action. Thus if malice is ever
to be an important factor (except on the question of punitive damages)
it will necessarily be in a case where the defendant's conduct is otherwise lawful. It is submitted, therefore, that the presence of malice, in a
case where the defendant's conduct is otherwise lawful, should resolve
the question of justification in plaintiff's favor, and a recovery should be
permitted. And in the instant case the fact that defendant made a false
expires, and the other arises when a person has been procured against his will or

contrary
to his purpose, by coercion or deception of another, to break his contract."
6
Elvington v. Waccamaw Shingle Co., 191 N. C. 515, 132 S. E. 274 (1926).
12 CooLEY, TORTS (3d ed. 1906) 948: "An action cannot, in general, be maintained for inducing a third person to 'breach his contract with the plaintiff, the
consequence, after all, being only a broken contract for which the party to the
contract may have his remedy by suing on it." The next sentence, which the
court does not quote, reads, "But if the person was induced to break his contract
by deception it may be different." On the subject of induecing breach of contract
it is said in that same volume that, "One who maliciously or without justifiable
cause induces a person to break his contract with another will be liable to the
latter for the damages resulting from such breach." 2 CooLEY, TORTS (3d ed.
1906)
592.
8
Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q. B. D. 598 (1889).
'Richardson v. Wilmington & Weldon R. Co., 126 N. C. 100, 35 S. E. 235

(1900) ; Biggers v. Matthews, 147 N. C. 299, 61 S.E. 55 (1908).
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statement concerning plaintiff's ability to pass good title should have
been evidence of malice sufficient to take the case to the jury.' 0
FRANKLIN T. DuPREE, JR.
Usury-Affirmative Relief for the Debtor.
In spite of the anomalous situation which results from such a decision,
and the questionable policy motivating it, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina seems determined to follow its line of cases which deny the
debtor party to a usurious contract affirmative relief of an equitable
nature.' In two cases decided this year,2 the creditor has brought action
to foreclose a deed of trust. The debtor has set up usury in his answer,
and prayed for injunctive relief. In both cases, defendant's prayer has
been denied on the tenuous and abstract ground that he has asked equity
and must therefore do equity-in other words, pay the principal plus
legal interest.3 Had the debtor restricted himself to purely legal defenses and remedies, he would have been required to pay no interest,
and could have recovered back double the amount of any interest already
paid. 4 Or, had he accompanied his prayer for an injunction with a
tender of principal and legal interest, presumably he could have had the
injunction, and saved his property from sale on foreclosure.5 But, having chosen neither of these alternatives, he was not only denied the
equitable relief which he asked, but, for the mere asking, was penalized
"- It will be noticed that malice in this connection is not used "in the sense of
actual ill-will to the plaintiff, but in the sense of an act done to the apparent damage of another without legal excuse." Morgan v. Smith, 77 N. C. 37 (1877)
(action for enticing away servants). This view finds support in other jurisdictons. Employing Printers Club v. Dr. Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S. E. 353
(1905); Quinlivian v. Brown Oil Co., 96 Mont. 147, 29 Pac. (2d) 374 (1934);
Lamb v. S. Cheney & Son, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817 (1920).
'For a discussion of this situation, see Comment (1934) 12 N. C. L. Ray.
279. See also Waters v. Garris, 188 N. C. 305, 124 S. E. 334 (1924).
'Thomason v. Swenson, 207 N. C. 519, 177 S.E.647 (1935) ; and C. D. Kenny
Co. v. Hinton Hotel Co., 208 N. C. 295, 180 S.E. 697 (1935). In the latter case,
receivers had been appointed for the debtor. The petition for foreclosure was
filed in the receivership proceeding. The other creditors and the receivers answered, praying for the injunction (among other things). The sale was ordered
and confirmed, and the lower court decreed that the petitioner was entitled to
principal plus six per cent interest. The receivers' appeal was dismissed on other
grounds, while the decree was affirmed on the creditors' appeal. The Court treats
the case as if only the debtor were the defendant.
The still more recent case of Ghormley v. Hyatt, 208 N. C. 478 (1935) incidentally reaffirms the rule, at p. 482.
3Yet note the Court's language in C. D. Kenny Co. v. Hinton Hotel Co., 208
N. C. 295, 298. 180 S. E. 697, 698 (1935): "If this was an action in which
[petitioner creditor] . . . was seeking to recover of the defendant [debtor] . ..
the amount due on his bond .... he would be liable for the statutory penalties for
usury."
I N. C. CoDE (1935) §2306, and annotations thereto. Also note 3 supra.
'Jonas v. Home Mortgage Co., 205 N. C. 89, 170 S. E. 127 (1933) semble.
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to the extent of entitling the creditor to principal and legal interest out
of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. It would seem that, if "equity"
is to govern, he should have either the relief which he asks or the benefit
of the usury statute. There can be no equity in denying him both simply because he seeks equity.
Such a decision virtually repeals the usury statute in certain cases,
and creates a troublesome and unnecessary inconsistency in the North
Carolina law, as pointed out in an earlier issue of this publication.6 The
inconsistency is further illustrated by the established rule in this state
that, when a junior incumbrancer goes into equity to require assignment
to him of a usurious senior incumbrance, he is forced to pay only the
principal, without interest. 7 Thus the debtor, for whose benefit the
usury statute was intended, must "do equity" and pay legal interest if
he asks for equity; but a stranger to the usurious contract can have the
8
full benefit of the statute-in equity.
If the Court were convinced of the advisability of overruling those
cases which require the debtor who seeks equity to pay legal interest-a
rule which was born under quite different conditions 9-there would seem
to be no obstacle in its way. The doctrine of stare decisis should not be
permitted to impede wholesome judicial reform in the law. 10 There are
no vested rights in judicial decisions," and certainly usurious creditors
have no vested right to be free from that particular type of relief to
their debtors.
However, if the Court feels bound by its earlier decisions, there
should be no hesitation by the legislature to so amend the statute as to
give debtors the full protection which the policy behind usury statutes
2
dictates.1
D. W. MARKHAM.
Comment (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 279, supra note 1
See a criticism of the rule in Annotation III A to N. C. CoDE (1935) §2306.
Contrast the results of the rule with the following typical language of the
Court: "The charging and accepting of illegal interest has always been looked
upon by the courts with disfavor. Usury is a source of untold wrong and oppression" [Ghormley v. Hyatt, 208 N. C. 478, 484 (1935)].
Sherrill v. Hood, 208 N. C. 472 (1935).
8
Cf. C. D. Kenny Co. v. Hinton Hotel Co., 208 N. C. 295, 180 S. E. 697 (1935),
supra note 2.
'See Comment (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 279, 280.
0

" Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort (1924) 37 H.Av.
L. R-v.409; Sims, The Problem of Stare Decisis in the Refori of the Law

(1930) 36 PA. B. A. RP. 170.
'See Iowa v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 516, 126 N. W. 454, 455 (1910).
' See the suggested amendment, Comment (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 279, 281.

